本研究以2008年至2019年上市櫃員工認股權發行資料做為樣本，分析認股權憑證發行對企業風險之影響。過去文獻有風險偏好及趨避之衝突觀點，實證結果發現，認股權證有助於解決代理問題，發行權證數量越高，將鼓勵經理人選擇系統性風險(Beta值)較高之決策，但經理人具有風險規避的本質，應同時消除非系統性風險，在以PSM模型消除權證特性影響後，其結果仍維持一致。此外，亦加入經理人持股變數，以衡量整體財富對風險之影響，實證結果顯示，經理人持股越高之公司，在發行員工認股權後，總體風險呈現下降趨勢，顯示經理人對於公司之投資決策更保守，反映尾端風險可能對財富造成侵蝕，呈現經理人風險趨避狀態。
本研究同時發現，產業創新條例19-1條提供租稅誘因，鼓勵企業採用股權獎酬工具，課稅時間點延緩至實際出售，且可採出售價格與取得價格孰低做為課稅依據，但緩課具有500萬額度上限，獎酬金額超過500萬額度仍需回歸正常課稅，使其實值效力降低，進而導致該租稅誘因無法對經理人的風險偏好及決策行為造成影響。

This study is to investigate the effect of executive incentives on company risk by using employee stock options issued by Taiwan-listed companies from 2008 to 2019. As a result of our study, the stock option is a helpful tool to solve agency problems. If the company issued more options, company profit would be in line with the managers. These will encourage managers to choose strategies that have higher systematic risk (Beta). However, since managers are risk aversion in nature, managers tend to maintain or lower total risk, meanwhile, they tend to eliminate unsystematic risk. The result holds the same when we use PSM Model to eliminate the effect of stock option character. Besides, we also add the manager holding effect in our empirical model, in order to evaluate total wealth impact on enterprise risk. Mangers would be afraid of downside risk, which results in risk aversion behaviors.
Innovation Act Art.19-1 provides tax incentives to encourage the company to adopt more employee compensation plans. We also take tax benefits provided by Industry Innovation Act Art.19-1 into consideration, in order to evaluate its impact on company risk. Based on the empirical results, tax incentives can’t change managers’ risk tendency and decision behavior. The main reason is it has 5,000 thousand limitations. The stock option which value exceeds the limit would be taxed in normal, which weakens its real impacts.

表目錄 v
壹、緒論 1
貳、文獻及假說發展 4
一、發行認股權因素 4
二、員工認股權與風險 4
三、假說發展 7
參、研究方法 12
一、應變數 12
二、自變數 13
三、控制變數 14
四、實證模型建立 16
五、樣本資料與選取 19
肆、實證結果與分析 21
一、發行權證樣本不同年度比較 21
二、敘述性統計 22
三、相關係數 23
四、迴歸實證結果 25
六、傾向分數配對方法之實證結果 31
伍、穩健性測試 36
陸、研究結論及、研究限制及未來研究建議 39
參考文獻 41

中文部分
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