根據過去學者所提出關於會計穩健性之相關文獻中,發現穩健會計與股利政策間具有負向關係,當會計資訊較穩健時,能減緩股東與管理者間之代理問題,進而使支付股利的需求下降。本文認為穩健會計亦為公司治理機制之一,兩者間具有替代效果。故本研究將進一步探討公司治理在穩健會計對股利政策的影響中是否具有干擾效果。 本文以2013年上市(櫃)公司為研究樣本,在實證模型上分別採用Khan and Watts(2009)的C-score指標,用以衡量穩健會計;參考Chay and Suh(2009)之方法計算現金股利;以第一屆由台灣證券櫃檯買賣中心及臺灣證券交易所共同推動「公司治理評鑑系統」之評鑑成績作為公司治理指標,刪除極端值後進行分析。實證結果顯示,2013年台灣上市(櫃)公司在穩健會計與股利政策間的影響並未顯著受到公司治理干擾。
From the previous literature proposed about literature in the accounting conservatism, we can find accounting conservatism is negative associated with dividend policy. As a firm's accounting information gets more conserva-tive, it is less occurred the angeny problem between shareholders and manag-ers, moreover, declined the demand of dividends. This paper argues that accounting conservatism also is one of the corpo-rate governance mechanism. The governance role of conservatism could be substituted by other governance mechanisms. Therefore, this study takes a deep investigation in whether the impact of accounting conservation on divi-dends depend on corporate governance (interference effect). Using the data of listed firms in Taiwan from 2013, this paper uses Khan and Watts(2009) C-score model measure of conservatism. Cash dividends was calculated to use the method of Chay and Suh(2009). The first edition of cor-porate governance evaluation conducted by the Securities and Futures Insti-tute Entrusted by Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation & Taipei Exchange as corporate governance index, and deleted the extreme values conducts test. The empirical results indicate that the impact of conservative accounting on the cash dividends wasn’t interfere with the corporate governance.