透過您的圖書館登入
IP:3.21.158.148
  • 期刊

企業選擇公司五年免稅與股東投資抵減租稅規劃之實證研究

An Empirical Investigation into Firms' Choices between Five-year Exemption from Corporate Income Tax and Shareholder Investment Tax Credits

摘要


促進產業升級條例第八條及第八條之一對於投資重要投資事業、科學工業及新興重要策略性產業提供企業可以選擇適用公司五年免稅或股東投資抵減二項重大之租稅優惠,是我國租稅獎勵措施的一大特性,也提供了一個獨特可以觀察公司租稅規劃決策是否以公司或股東稅負最有利為考量的機會。本文乃是以上市公司民國84年至90年度申請這項獎勵投資案件之資料,探討影響企業選擇適用公司五年免稅或股東投資抵減租稅規劃之因素。本文的實證研究結果發現,公司在進行獎勵投資計劃時,資金來源的規劃與其選擇公司五年免稅或股東投資抵減有顯著之關聯性,股東現金增資比率較高之投資計劃,較會傾向選擇股東投資抵減,以增加股東的租稅利益。此外,兩稅合一之後,稅負較高之公司對於減少營利事業階段稅負之誘因也會較兩稅合一實施前降低,也會較傾向選擇股東投資抵減。投資新興重要策略性產業之公司也較傾向採用股東投資抵減,以減少其股東的實質稅負。然而,本文並未發現不同股東身分結構會影響企業選擇公司五年免稅或股東投資抵減的實證證據,且兩稅合一後,仍有相當比例之公司選擇公司五年免稅,顯示公司的租稅規劃並非以股東租稅利益最大化為唯一考量。

並列摘要


To encourage the development of the newly-emerging strategic industries, the Statute for Upgrading Industries (Taiwan) provides two important alternatives of tax incentives to stimulate companies' investments in the qualified strategic industries. Companies that invest in the qualified strategic industries may select either a period of five-year exemption from corporate income tax on income derived from those investments or the investment tax credits for their corporate (individual) shareholders up to 20% (10%) of dollar amount of the qualified investments. Similar tax incentives had been granted to qualified investments in important venture capital and important technology-based enterprises during 1995-1999. Using 1995-2001 data of listed companies applying for those qualified investments, this study examines firms' decisions on the choice between the two tax incentives, and empirically investigates into the factors associated with the choice decisions. The decision to choose either of the two tax incentives provides an opportunity to examine whether the tax planning of firms is pursuing the maximum tax benefits of shareholders. In addition, by examining the factors associated with the choice decisions, our study also contributes to the understanding of how firms trade off nontax costs with tax benefits in achieving optimal values of the firms. Our empirical results show that ceteris paribus, companies whose qualified investments are funded by shareholders' cash investment tend to select the tax incentive of investment tax credits for their shareholders. The result is possibly due to that for every qualified investment project, if the firm chooses shareholder investment credit, the granted amount of tax credit is in proportion to the percentage of the qualified project funded by shareholders' cash investment in the project. Therefore, the greater the percentage of the qualified project funded by shareholders' cash investment, the greater tax benefits for the company to choose investment tax credit for its shareholders. Further, after implementation of the Imputation System, companies having greater effective tax rates are more likely to choose the shareholder investment tax credits, because income tax paid at the corporate level can be distributed to shareholders as imputation credit and used to offset shareholders' personal income tax, thereby reducing companies' incentive to cut down corporate income tax. Finally, after implementation of the Imputation System, the Taiwanese government is gradually scaling down income tax credits available to the individuals. The tax credit of investing in the newly-emerging strategic industries becomes one of the few tax credits that are still available to the individuals in the current tax system. Therefore, we also find that firms investing in the newly-emerging strategic industries are more likely to choose the shareholder investment tax credits to grasp the shrinking opportunity of obtaining tax credits for their individual shareholders. We, however, do not find evidence on the association between shareholder structures and the choice of the two incentives. Further, there remain a substantial percentage of firms choosing the incentive of corporate five-year tax exemption after implementation of the Imputation System. The results suggest that in choosing the two tax incentives, companies are not bound to pursue the objective of maximizing shareholders' tax benefits.

參考文獻


陳明進(2003)。我國租稅優惠對營利事業租稅負擔之影響。管理評論。22(1),127-151。
Duke, J. C.,H. G. III. Hunt(1990).An Empirical Examination of Debt Covenant Restrictions and Accounting-Related Debt Proxies.Journal of Accounting and Economics.12(1),45-63.
Ely, D. P.,A. L. Houston,C. O. Houston(2002).Taxes and the Choice of Issuing Preferred Stock vs. Debt.Journal of the American Taxation Association.24(1),29-45.
Enis, C. R. ,B. Ke(2003).The Impact of the 1986 Tax Reform Act on Income Shifting from Corporate to Shareholder Tax Bases: Evidence from the Motor Carrier Industry.Journal of Accounting Research.41(1),65-88.
Graham, J. R.(2000).How Big Are the Tax Benefits of Debt?.Journal of Finance.55(5),1904-1945.

被引用紀錄


黃郁芳(2009)。外資企業進入中國併購租稅規範之研究〔碩士論文,淡江大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2009.00990
Chang, H. H. (2010). 股利政策的演變、稅制改革以及庫藏股買回-以台灣公司為例 [master's thesis, National Chiao Tung University]. Airiti Library. https://doi.org/10.6842/NCTU.2010.00261
李秋萍(2017)。兩稅合一新制對企業盈餘穩健度之影響-以Basu模型分析〔碩士論文,中原大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201700316
陳美文(2010)。研究發展租稅抵減、盈餘管理 與公司研發支出的關聯性〔碩士論文,中原大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201000339

延伸閱讀