從「不首先使用核武」之爭議論核武角色之演變

The Policy of “No-First-Use” and the Evolution of the Role of Nuclear Weapons

陳世民(Shih-Min Chen)

《問題與研究》 37卷10期 (1998/10) Pp. 23-35

https://doi.org/10.30390/ISC.199810_37(10).0002

摘要

冷戰時期，在北約尋求「無戰爭的嚇組」戰略下，強調不惜「首先使用」戰術核武之可能性的意志，乃北約用以嚇阻蘇聯佔優勢的傳統武力突然奇襲之基石。冷戰結束後，北約在甌陸已擁有傳統武力之優勢，此一傳統武力或許已足以抵禦任何非核武威脅的挑戰，並取代戰術核武「首先使用」的嚇阻角色。不首先使用核武承諾有助於維持核武「只用於嚇阻核武」之戰略角色的正當性；並顯示核武的無用，以減少它所代來的政治威望，而降低核武繁衍的可能。

關鍵字

不首先使用、核武、嚇阻、核不繁衍

並列摘要

During the Cold War, NATO planners had always assumed Soviet superiority in conventional forces and therefore NATO found it necessary to deter a surprise Soviet attack through threats to resort to the “first use” of tactical nuclear weapons. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has enjoyed superiority in conventional forces and thus has no use for the deterrent role of the “first use” policy. The promise of “no first use” would help to legitimatize the strategic role of nuclear weapons: nuclear weapens only deter nuclear attacks. It could also signify the “non-utility” of nuclear force, diminish its political prestige, and thus help reduce the possibility of nuclear proliferation.

並列關鍵字

No first use ； nuclear weapons ； deterrence ； nuclear non-proliferation

參考文獻

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Blackaby, Frank, Goldblat, Jozef, Lodgaard, Sverre(1984).No First Use.London:Taylor and Francis, SIPRI.