本文試圖掌握「可靠性」、「知德」與「證立內在面」的關聯。我認為可靠論所要求的「證立的世界索引性」足以回應「後設不融貫難題」以及「新惡魔難題」,然而該學說終究走向了引入內在觀要素的知德知識論。這是由於該學說在回應兩大難題時,仍必須正視「證立」的內在面,而為了將此想法納入,最後還是有賴於將「知德」概念引進可靠論內。這是一個重大的轉折,相較於傳統知識論將「證立」視為「基於信念的」,知德知識論將「證立」視為「基於主體的」。傳統以來,「證立」是就「信念」來說的,但知德知識論則是從「知德」來說「證立」,而「知德」是認知主體的能力,主體的知性努力才是信念證立與否的關鍵。
This essay was an attempt to understand the relationships between reliability, virtue, and the internal dimension of epistemic justification. I argued that the appeal to world indexicality of justification in several variants of Goldman's reliabilism should be adequate for solving the problem of meta-incoherence and the new evil demon problem. However, the externalist reliabilism finally moves to the internalism-oriented virtue epistemology. I argued that the main reason is that externalists cannot ignore the internalist insights brought about by the above two problems. This is a major turning point in epistemology, for traditionally justification is belief-based whilst virtue epistemology is subject-based.
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