帕特南對於詹姆士的實用主義真理觀與實在觀的繼承與發展

Hilary Putnam's Acceptance and Development of William James's Pragmatic Views of Truth and Reality

鄭喜恆(Hsi-Heng Cheng)

《東吳哲學學報》 29期 (2014/02) Pp. 25-62

摘要

帕特南是近年來致力於提倡與發展美國實用主義思想的一位重要哲學家，並且非常重視詹姆士的實用主義哲學。本文旨在指出，帕特南所發展之關於「真理」與「實在」的實在論立場可視為是對於詹姆士的實用主義真理觀與實在觀的批判繼承與發展。首先，帕特南與詹姆士皆嘗試要發展有別於傳統實在論以及文化相對論之實在論立場。其次，帕特南批判地發展了可見於詹姆士的實用主義真理觀與實在觀的下列三個主張：（1）「真」與「理想化的理性可接受性」有密切關連；（2）觀念多元論；（3）「事實／約定」二分不成立。藉由系統性地比對帕特南與詹姆士之立場的共同點，我們能夠更清楚地看出詹姆士的實用主義真理觀與實在觀是帕特南所發展之實在論立場的一個主要思想源頭。

關鍵字

帕特南 ； 詹姆士 ； 實用主義 ； 多元論 ； 實在論

並列摘要

Hilary Putnam is one of the contemporary philosophers who highly regard American pragmatism and have greatly contributed to its recent revival. This paper systematically uncovers the common features in Putnam's and William James's views about truth and reality, showing that Putnam's realist view can be taken as a further articulation and critical elaboration of James's pragmatic views of truth and reality in his Pragmatism. They both strive to establish a defensible realist view different from both traditional realism and cultural relativism, both of which they deem unacceptable. In constructing his own realist view, Putnam critically develops the following three theses, all of which are manifest in James's pragmatic views of truth and reality: (1) the close relatedness of truth and ideal rational acceptability; (2) conceptual pluralism; and (3) the untenability of the fact/convention dichotomy.

並列關鍵字

Hilary Putnam ； William James ； pragmatism ； pluralism ； realism

參考文獻

鄭喜恆(2011)。詹姆士的實用主義「實在」觀。歐美研究。41(4)，977-1021。

Kraushaar, O. F. (1940). Lotze's Influence on the Pragmatism and Practical Philosophy of William James. Journal of the History of Ideas, 1, 4: 439-458.

Schiller, F. C. S. (1902). Axioms as Postulates. In H. Sturt (Ed.), Personal Idealism: Philosophical Essays by Eight Members of the University of Oxford (pp. 47-133). London: Macmillan.

Case, J.(1997).On the Right Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.The Southern Journal of Philosophy.35(1),1-18.

Case, J.(2001).The Heart of Putnam's Pluralistic Realism.Revue Internationale de Philosophie.55,417-430.