為求政局穩定與改革開放政策的延續,一九七八年以後中共開始推動「幹部年輕化」和「梯隊接班」。儘管部分具體規範尚未確立,但「幹部年輕化」已經是中共政治菁英所接受的共識。由於「幹部年輕化」已成為中共權力鬥爭的一項重要遊戲規則,勢必會影響中共黨內不同派系間與不同世代政治菁英間的互動,因此相關規範可以提供吾人評估中共政治繼承的重要線索。如果中共十六大時順利進行新舊交替,中共「梯隊接斑」的制度化程度將會進一步提升,有助於中共政權的穩定。反之,如果十六大無法順利進行人事更替,就顯現中共建立政治繼承制度的努力受到挫折,不利於政權穩定。同時,這也代表大陸內部出現更緊迫的問題,必須放慢接班的速度。
For the sake of political stability and the continuance of reform and openness, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began to decrease the average age of party cadres and to build up a system of ”succession by echelon” -whereby the leadership is composed of groups arranged hierarchically by age and other factors-after 1978. Although some detailed rules or norms regarding this ”deannuation” of the CCP top leadership remain uncertain (such as the retirement age of the CCP General Secretary), there has been a consensus among CCP elites over this policy. This consensus provides us crucial clues to evaluate future political succession in China. Due to the superannuation of the incumbent CCP top leadership, inevitable are significant personnel changes in the CCP Politburo, its Standing Committee, and the CCP Central Military Commission. If the deannuation of the CCP top leadership is completed at the CCP 16th Party Congress in 2002, the model of ”succession by echelon” is further institutionalized. If not, the CCP will meet with a setback in terms of establishing a stable mechanism of political succession.