情感的合理性

The Rationality of Emotion

蘇隆德(Ronald de Sousa) ； 馬競松(Jing-Song Ma) ； 沈清松

《哲學與文化》 32卷10期 (2005/10) Pp. 35-66

https://doi.org/10.7065/MRPC.200510.0035

摘要

我們應如何理解情感的合理性？本文第一部分將探求認知和策略兩模型的類比，檢驗它們關於情感欲望的直覺。我區分主觀的和客觀的欲望，進而提出情感具有一個從「範式劇情」導出的語意學，按此我們情感的全部劇目是後天學來的，並且我們情感的形式對象也是固定的。它頗能合乎合理性的一般原則，特別是最低合理性(minima rationality)原則。
本文第二部分轉向合理性這一面。我將探問情感如何對信念、欲望和行為的合理性有貢獻。我將提出一個相當一般性的生物學假說：情感透過控制突顯知覺和推理的特性，使我們免除由於特定困境而在地導致癱瘓；它們藉著暫時模擬知覺信息的簡化，從而限制我們在實踐上和認知上的選擇。

關鍵字

情感 ； 合理性 ； 自主性 ； 主觀欲望 ； 客觀欲望 ； 範式劇情

並列摘要

How are we to understand emotional or axiological rationality? I pursue analogies with both the cognitive and the strategic models, testing them against intuitions about emotional desires. We distinguish two different classes of desires, the subjective and the objective, and propose that emotions have a semantics that derives from ”paradigmatic scenarios”, in terms of which our emotional repertoire is learned and the formal objects of our emotions fixed. This fits in well with emerging facts about how our emotional capacities develop, and it can also be squared with the general principles of rationality, particularly minimal rationality.
In the second part, I return to the perspective of rationality. I ask how emotions contribute to the rationality of beliefs, desires, and behavior. I proffer a very general biological hypothesis: Emotions spare us the paralysis potentially induced by a particular predicament by controlling the salience of features of perception and reasoning; they temporarily mimic the informational encapsulation of perception and so circumscribe our practical and cognitive options.

並列關鍵字

Emotions ； Rationality ； Autonomy ； Subjective Desires ； Objective Desires ； Paradigm Scenarios