哲學詮釋學Ⅰ：早期海德格，以及施萊爾瑪赫和狄爾泰的初步回顧

Philosophical Hermeneutics Ⅰ: Early Heidegger, with a Preliminary Glance Back at Schleiermacher and Dilthey

Richard E. Palmer ； 李佳馨(Carine Lee)

《哲學與文化》 35卷2期 (2008/02) Pp. 45-68

https://doi.org/10.7065/MRPC.200802.0045

摘要

1.施萊爾瑪赫(Friedrich Schleiermacher)對於詮釋學發展的貢獻 施萊爾瑪赫在詮釋學發展的歷史上做了一個決定性的轉向，當他提出來「普遍的詮釋學」(Universal Hermeneutics)，詮釋學將應用於所有文本的詮釋。當傳統詮釋學包含了理解、說明以及應用時，施萊爾瑪赫所注意的是詮釋學為「理解的藝術」。施萊爾瑪赫也引入心理學的詮釋，可以藉其穿透文本作者的個體性和靈魂。他要詮釋學成為系統化，且批評先前的詮釋學只是「規則的合併」以及缺乏系統的一致性。毋寧說，它們是處理不同問題組合的方法。施萊爾瑪赫的詮釋學指向避免文本的誤解。這部份最後的討論是高達美對施萊爾瑪赫的批評。 2.狄爾泰(Wilhelm Dilthey)對哲學詮釋學的貢獻 狄爾泰寫了關於施萊爾瑪赫的論文，包括了新教詮釋學的歷史，自宗教改革以來作為第二參考的書籍。他是個博學的學者且在很多主題上有所論述。對於我們的目的而言，狄爾泰是個具有熱情的生命哲學家，他置放了人文和社會科學在一個和自然科學平等的立足點，藉由奠基在詮釋學上發展了一個基本的方法論。但是在科學的競爭之下，他找尋”Allgemeingultigkeit”，一個普遍的有效性，這樣做他朝向了給予太多的基礎到科學上思想的方法。他仍然是個哲學詮釋學主要發展的人物。 3.海德格(Martin Heidegger)對哲學詮釋學之前以及在《存有與時間》的貢獻 哲學詮釋學發展的決定性轉向是在海德格，這位與生俱來，有原創性的哲學家的早期作品。他在弗萊堡(Freiburg)是胡塞爾(Edmund Husserl)的助手，且在胡塞爾的現象學創立了一個有用的超越傳統哲學的方法，但是他仍然太過於依存於胡塞爾科學的有效性。 第一部份：海德格早期的演說：《存有學－事實性的詮釋學》 這本書在海德格過世後才出版(1988)在1999 年才出版英文翻譯，海德格這一系列藉由事實性詮釋學的存有學給了我們一個關於他的詮釋學理解意義。他規避了傳統詮釋學的意義，回到了古希臘hermeneueinc和hermeneia的慣用法。他嘗試超越當代客體性的限制，經由回返到古希臘時期一般語言的慣用法。詮釋學遇到以口說詮釋的荷馬，發表，翻譯和解釋。他的詮釋學歷史的說明在柏拉圖和亞里斯多德之後是個奠基在希臘慣用法豐富性的遺失與衰微。但是詮釋學對海德格來說是個接近某物的方法，這些早期的演講詮釋學成了接近事實性的方法，是前詮釋理解的領域作為此有(Dasein)面對著生活。 最後詮釋學成為對於此有自我理解的方法，但是在寫給他學生Engelbert Kerbs的信，海德格也強調了認識的歷史特質。我們從我們在歷史的情境理解，我們的理解形成的結構是經由歷史形塑概念甚至是我們的語言。在狄爾泰的詮釋學他也強調理解的歷史基礎。海德格從狄爾泰採取這個觀點。海德格在他的演講定義詮釋學為「事實性的參與，接近，審問和說明的一致方法。」詮釋學是詮釋不只是理解作為認識的消極過程，而是積極的參與、審問和接近。事實性本身是詮釋的，它透過問題和答案理解某物。海德格走回我們理解必要條件的因素，理解的「前結構」。他說這個前有的部份，屬於認知和理解的本質，我們理解某物「為」某物，且我們理解它在一個特定的歷史情境。更進一步，我們了解它在一個期待的存在視域，一個經由不確定性喚起的視域，經由未來基礎問題的視域，那是「可能性存有」的視域，對於特殊存有在特殊時空可能的視域。這些早期海德格的作品已經發現可能性存有的意義。 所有這些都領導我們到一個新的人文科學的概念。除了作為一個具有理性的動物，如亞里斯多德所言，人是一個包含可能未來的存有，包含時間性的存有。人是尋找了解他們自身的存有。海德格說到，詮釋學提供一個對於人新概念的觀點。第二部份：存有與時間(Being and Time)(1927) 詮釋學首次提到是在《存有與時間》的第七節，海德格已詮釋現象學為如其所是。他發現了「現象學描述的意義作為在詮釋學倚靠的方法，此有的現象學的logos具有hermeneuein的特質，此有的現象學是使用這個字基本含意的詮釋學，它指示了詮釋的工作。」在第二個意義，海德格在詮釋學裡發現對於此有存有意義揭蔽的方法。第三個意義是詮釋此有為連續地使它的未來成為可能，它的未來存有。 第31節對詮釋學很重要，因為此有的存有被表明為理解。理解是人存在的中心過程，在第32節標題是「詮釋和理解」，詮釋建築在理解上。它視察周遭的世界且理解事物作為這個或那個，總是從未作為純粹的知覺。正如海德格所言，「視力的觀看總是已經理解和詮釋」，換言之，沒有純粹的知覺優先於詮釋，總是有發問和詮釋的視域。 第44節，海德格也談論真理，在它的現代形式作為是真的陳述，是從總是在進行的理解和詮釋較深的過程所導出的。但是當真理被正確的定義為存有的聯結，因此它進入基礎存有學的視域。它是存有的開顯，這種洞察是引導他走向藝術觀點的部份，在下個演講將會討論。

關鍵字

此有 ； 詮釋學 ； 事實性 ； 理解 ； 人文科學

並列摘要

This lecture primarily presents the two early works of Heidegger in which hermeneutics plays a definitive role. As background, the contributions of Schleiermacher and Dilthey are presented briefly before going into Heidegger's contribution.
Ⅰ. Schleiermacher's Contribution to the Development of a Philosophical Hermeneutics
Schleiermacher made a decisive turn in the history of hermeneutics when he proposed a ”Universal Hermeneutics,” a hermeneutics that would apply to all kinds of text interpretation. While traditional hermeneutics included moments of understanding, explication and application, Schleiermacher focused on hermeneutics as the ”art of understanding.” Schleiermacher also introduced psychological interpretation whereby one tried to penetrate the individuality and soul of the author of a text. He wanted hermeneutics to be systematic, and he criticized previous hermeneutics for being only an ”amalgam of rules” and lacking systematic coherence. Rather, they were methods for dealing with an array of different kinds of problems. Schleiermacher's hermeneutics was directed at avoiding misunderstanding of the text. At the end of this section Gadamer's criticisms of Schleiermacher will be discussed.
Ⅱ. Dilthey's Contribution to Philosophical Hermeneutics
Dilthey wrote his dissertation on Schleiermacher and included a history of Protestant hermeneutics since the Reformation as a second companion volume. He was a broadly educated professor and wrote on many topics. For our purposes, Dilthey was a life-philosopher with a passion for placing the Humanities and Social Sciences on an equal footing with the Natural Sciences by developing a basic methodology for them based on hermeneutics. But in competing with the sciences, he sought an ”Allgemeingultigkeit,” a universal validity, and in doing so he tended to give too much ground to the way of thinking in the sciences. Still, he is a major figure in the development of philosophical hermeneutics.
Ⅲ. The Contribution of Martin Heidegger to Philosophical Hermeneutics before and in Being and Time
The decisive turn in the development of a philosophical hermeneutics came in the early writings of Martin Heidegger, a radical and original philosopher. He was in Freiburg an assistant to Husserl and found in Husserl's phenomenology a useful way of overcoming traditional philosophy, but he still found Husserl too preoccupied with scientific validity.
Part Ⅰ: Heidegger's Early Lectures: Ontology-the Hermeneutics of Facticity
A posthumously published (1988) and translated (1999) set of Heidegger's lectures on ontology in terms of a hermeneutics of facticity gives us a sense of his understanding of hermeneutics. He bypassed the traditional sense of hermeneutics and went back to the Greek usage of hermeneuein and hermeneia. He attempted to overcome the limitations of modern objectivity by returning to the usages current in ordinary language in ancient Greece. There hermeneutics meant orally interpreting Homer, announcing, translating, and explaining. His account of the history of hermeneutics after Plato and Aristotle is a history of decline and loss of the richness found in Greek usage. But hermeneutics for Heidegger meant a means of access to something, and in these early lectures hermeneutics became an interpretive means of access to facticity, to the realm of pre-interpretive understanding as Dasein faces life.
Ultimately hermeneutics became a means for the self-understanding for Dasein. But in a letter to his student, Engelbert Krebs, Heidegger also emphasizes the historical character of cognition. We understand from our situation in history, and our understanding is structured by historically shaped concepts and even our language. Dilthey, too, emphasized the historical matrix for understanding in his hermeneutics, and Heidegger took this up from Dilthey. Heidegger defined hermeneutics in the opening lines of the lectures as ”the unified manner of the engaging, approaching, accessing, interrogating, and explication of facticity.” Hermeneutics as interpretation is not just understanding as a passive process of cognition but an active engaging, interrogating, and accessing. Facticity itself is interpretive in that it sees what something is through question and answer. Heidegger is stepping back into the factors that precondition our understanding, the ”forestructure” of understanding. This forehaving, he says, belongs to the very nature of knowing and understanding. We see something ”as” something, and we see it in a specific historical situation. Furthermore, we see it in an existential horizon of expectation, a horizon haunted by uncertainty, by the ”fundamental questionability of the future, that is of ”possible being,” of what is possible for this particular being at this particular time and place. Already in these early works Heidegger finds in the sense of what is possible being, a sense of ”ontic questionability, care, restlessness, anxiety, temporality.” All of this leads to a new conception of humanity. Instead of being an animal endowed with reason, as in Aristotle, a human being is a being with a possible future, a being with temporality. Humans are beings seeking to know themselves. Hermeneutics, Heidegger says, offers the standpoint for a new conception of the human being.
Part Ⅱ: Being and Time (1927) The first mention of hermeneutics is in section 7 of Being and Time, where Heidegger is already interpreting phenomenology as letting what is show itself. He finds that ”the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation. The logos of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of hermēneúein. The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the original signification of the word, where it designates the work of interpreting.” In a second sense, Heidegger finds in hermeneutics a means of uncovering the meaning of being for Dasein. And the third sense is the interpretation Dasein as continually making its future possibilities, its future being.
Section 31 is important to hermeneutics because there the being of Dasein is said to be understanding. Understanding is the central process of an existing human being. In section 32, titled ”Understanding and Interpretation,” interpretation builds on understanding. It looks around at the surrounding world and sees things as this or that, always already, never as pure perception. As Heidegger puts it, ”The seeing of this sight is always already understanding and interpreting.” In other words, there is no pure perception prior to interpretation; there is always the horizon of questioning and interpreting.
In section 44, Heidegger argues that truth, too, in its modern forms as statements which are true, is derivative from the deeper processes of understanding and interpreting that are always already going on. But when truth is rightfully defined in connection with being, then it moves into the horizon of fundamental ontology. It is the disclosure of being. This insight is part of what leads him to his view of art, which we will discuss in the next lectur.

並列關鍵字

Dasein ； Hermeneutics ； Facticity ； Understanding Humanity

參考文獻

(1969).Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer.Evanston:Northwestern University Press.

(1996).Selected Works.Princeton:Princeton University Press.

Andrew Bowie,Karl Ameriks(translated),Desmond M. Clarke(1998).Hermeneutics and Criticism: And Other Writings.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

D. E. Schleiermacher(1959).Hermeneutik: Nach den Handschriften neu herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Heinz Kimmerle.Heidelberg:Carl Winter Universitatsverlag.

James Duke (translated),Jack Forstman(1977).Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts.Missoula, Montana:Scholar`s Press.