人權的基礎是經驗嗎？－評德蕭維奇(Alan Dershowitz)的人權論

人權往往被視為理所當然，然而「人權的基礎是甚麼？」這問題不易回答，德蕭維奇(Alan Dershowitz)在他2004 的書中(Rights from Wrongs: A Secular Theory of the Origins of Rights)探討這棘手問題。他主要考慮了以下四種理論：一、外在論：人權的根源是在法律以外，如人權神授論；二、內在論：人權的根源是在法律以內－法實證論(legal positivism)；三、理性主義進路：人權的基礎在於理性直覺(rational intuition)；四、以經驗為本的進路：人權來自人類的經驗，特別是體驗不公義的經驗。他對前三種理論都提出猛烈批評，而提倡第四種以經驗為本的進路。本文指出雖然德蕭維奇的經驗論有不少優點，然而它在證立人權標準方面有含糊和不一致之處，而它的發明論則更不能為人權提供穩實的基礎。其實這些問題德蕭維奇或多或少是覺察的，他多次指出人權需要外在於法律的標準，我認為人權神授論是可能為人權提供基礎的世界觀之一。德蕭維奇對人權神授論的批評有很好的提醒作用，但我認為這仍不能排除以基督為中心的當代基督教人權論。

關鍵字

人權；德蕭維奇；人權神授論；以經驗為本的人權觀

並列摘要

Human rights are often taken for granted but in fact the origin or foundation of human rights is not an easy question. Alan Dershowitz tries to tackle this thorny issue in his 2004 book: Rights from Wrongs: A Secular Theory of the Origins of Rights. He mainly considers four theories: 1) externalism, e.g., the divine source of human rights theory; 2) Internalism, e.g., legal positivism; 3) Rationalism, e.g., the claim that human rights are founded upon rational intuitions; 4) Experiential approach, i.e., human rights are derived from our historical experience of serious wrongs or injustice. He severely criticizes the first three theories, and defends the fourth. In this article, I will point out that despite quite a few merits of Dershowitz's theory; his criteria for the validation of human rights are vague or even inconsistent. His general stance of constructivism towards moral and human rights claims, moreover, are unable to provide solid foundations for human rights. In fact Dershowitz is to some extent aware of these problems, and he feels that human rights do need an objective external source, if only it is possible. I think the theistic worldview is indeed able to provide this objective external source. Dershowitz has raised a lot of good questions for the divine source theory but I argue that in the end they cannot exclude the possibility of a contemporary Christocentric theory of human rights.