競標方法應用於廢棄物處理設施區位選定的研究

An Experiment of Auction in Determining the Plant Location of a Waste Disposal Facility

林享博(Sheang-Bor Lin) ； 錢志偉(Chih-Wei Chien)

《國立台灣大學建築與城鄉研究學報》 8期 (1996/06) Pp. 77-86

https://doi.org/10.6154/JBP.1996.8.006

摘要

本研究選擇一組鄉鎮市，並採用Kunreuther，Kleindorfer，Knez與Yaksick（1987）的競標機制來進行模擬競標，以決定一個共用的廢棄物處理設施應設立於何鄉鎮，以及各鄉鎮應分攤的補償數額。研究結果發現：當各鄉鎮能自己決定願接受的，及願付給他人的補償數額時，由於採用小中取大策略不能得到正的利潤，因此標價不會逼近於此策略所代表的數值。若在投標前各鄉鎮均公佈其預定的廢棄物處理設施區位，則某一鄉鎮會因不同鄉鎮所提出的區位而變更他所願意付給各鄉鎮的金額，此將使最低標得標鄉鎮不一定能為全體鄉鎮帶來最大的效益。雖是如此，由於此機制能讓有關鄉鎮表達其偏好，且能讓其事先知道自己的決策所帶來的結果，所以仍不失為一個公平可取的方法，至於如何設計一個更有效率的機制則有待進一步的研究。

並列摘要

The study selects a group of jurisdictions to simulate an auction for choosing a jurisdiction to be the site for a waste disposal facility. The simulation of the auction largely follows the procedure proposed by Kunreuther, Kleindorfer, Knez and Yaksick (1987), but with some arrangements changed. The result shows that the jurisdictions may not follow the maximin bidding strategy if they by themselve can decide the value which they are willing to accept for accommodating the facility, and the value which they are willing to pay for other jurisdictions to accommodate it. When the alternative locations for the facility are announced before the auction, one jurisdiction may change the amounts it is willing to pay for different jurisdictions. Then, the jurisdiction with the lowest bid may not bring the maximal profit for all the jurisdictions. Despite this, it is still an equitable mechanism since it allows each community to express its own preference and to foresee the result of its decision. Further study should aim at revising the mechanism to obtain a more efficient result.