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經濟設計下單票制最適配票策略之研究

A Study on Economical Design for Optimal Votes Allocation Strategy at Single Voting System

摘要


本文針對組織內之配票建構-穩健配票模型,依此模型可計算出我方規劃人選之穩健配票數及穩當選人數。為達成此配票目標,本文亦發展-數學規劃模型,以期總配票成本最小化。另外,針對以非結構選民為主體之選舉,本文提出以統計抽樣調查為基礎之抽樣設計,估計各候選人之得票數並控制型-誤差。運用數值分析之遞迴運算方法計算最低可當選票數。以我方結構性選民為配票利基,進行槓桿式配票。最後亦建構-數學規劃模型以求解滿足槓桿式配票目標之經濟設計,使總配票成本或總配票困難度最小化。本文亦於文中提出三個與配票有關之定理並加以證明。

並列摘要


This paper constructs a conservative votes allocation model for intra-organizational voting. By applying this model, we can calculate the amount of steady elected votes and the number of elects for our party. As to reach the votes allocation purpose, this paper also proposes a mathematical programming model to minimize the total cost or total difficulty for votes allocation. At another situation, if the majority of voters are non-structure, this paper applies a statistical sampling theory to decide the sample size and thus to control the type Ⅰ error. Base on the sample survey, we can estimate the amount of votes for each candidate. By applying the recursive computing method, we can obtain the least votes for elect, then we can adopt leverage votes allocation method for our structural voters. Finally, we also formulate a mathematical model to minimize the total cost or total difficulty for votes allocation. In this paper we propose three theorems for single voting system and prove its existence.

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