過去探討公司治理的研究多著重於單-監督機制的影響,缺乏整合性考量公司治理內、外部監督機制,也鮮少探討企業國際化對公司治理的影響。本研究嘗試整合代理理論、管家理論和國際企業理論的觀點,試圖應用與解釋各理論在企案國際化與內外部監督機制對管理當局投機性盈餘管理之影響。本文以2002至2005年間台灣上市資訊電子業1171個觀察值為樣本,進行追蹤資料的迴歸分析,實證結果顯示,董事會結構中的董事長兼任總經理制度及董監事獨立性、外部精練法人監督、企業國際化等機制,均能降低企業進行盈餘管理的程度,有效發揮內、外部監督功能。這些競爭性的理論中,本文認為代理理論比管家理論更具解釋力,同時國際化理論亦對公司治埋產生深遠的影響。
The resulting literature has been emphasizing the importance of corporate governance and focusing on the impact of one mechanism en financial reports. There is less research that synthesizes the diversified monitor tools or incorporates the influence of internationalization on corporate governance. In this study, we apply the internationalization theory, agency theory, and stewardship theory to investigate the impact of internal and external monitoring mechanisms as well as internationalization on earnings management Based on a sample of 1171 observations from listed firms in the electron industry between 2002 and 2005, we find that the CEO duality, independency of directors, monitoring from sophisticated institutional investors, and enterprises internationalization could reduce the earnings manipulation by managers. Furthermore, among the competitive theories, we find that the agency theory is more suitable in explaining of corporate governance than stewardship theory. Our result also sheds light on the important impact of the internationalization theory on corporate governance system.
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