儒家如何看待「道德運氣」？－以Bernard Williams的「道德運氣」為參考架構

Williams堅持保留嚴格意義的道德觀念，不主張有道德運氣的存在。但Williams試圖藉由對「道德運氣」的討論，揭露人類倫理生活的本質，從而對道德哲學作進一步的反省。儒家本於其自律倫理學的立場，亦不認為道德受運氣影響；但於此同時，儒家對倫理生活中的道德評價現象與道德衝突現象亦多所言及，只是並未將這些看法置於「道德運氣」的論述脈絡之中。本文希望藉由Williams對於「道德運氣」的說法，對儒家的相關倫理論述予以分析，從而標示出儒家在「道德」與「運氣」的關係上可能展開的思考面向。

關鍵字

道德運氣；行為者遺憾；行動的證成；伯納．威廉斯；儒家

並列摘要

It is well-known that Bernard Williams insists the rigid sense of morality by claiming the inexistence of what he refers to as ”moral luck”. But, at the same time, he makes a great deal of discussion on it by which he aims to explore the essence of humans' ethical life, on the one hand, and to provide a foundation, through such an exploration, for a further reflection of moral philosophy, on the other. Confucianism, as believing in moral autonomy, seems to have nothing to do with the conception of ”moral luck,” despite its fruitful discourses on moral evaluation in general as well as moral conflicts in particular. By Bernard Williams's theory of moral luck, this article tries to come to a deep understanding of the ethical discourses in selected Confucian texts, exploring the possibility in which a thinking of the relation between ”morality” and ”luck,” from Confucian perspective, would be available.