John Hare has argued that Kant does not reject the divine command theory in general because he himself accepts a form of the theory. While Kant denies that divine commands are the source of the content of duties, he believes that duties depend on divine commands for their authority, so says Hare. This articles attempts to clarify Kant's conception of moral legislator as author of obligation. By referring to Kant's distinction between natural and positive obligations, I argue that the moral law is a natural law and its obligation has no author. While Kant calls God author of the obligation in accordance with the moral law, he means that God is the author of the positive obligation of divine commands, or alternatively speaking, God is the enhancer of the obligation of the moral law by transforming it from a natural obligation into a positive one. As God is not the author of the obligation of the moral law as such, moral duties do not depend on divine commands for their authority. I, therefore, conclude that Hare's thesis is not plausible.
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