投資風險、離職金設計與公司治理結構

Investment Risk, Severance Packages and Corporate Governance Structures

詹家昌(Chia-Chung Chan) ； 陳光華(Kaung-Hwa Chen) ； 許永明(Yung-Ming Shiu)

《管理評論》 23卷4期 (2004/10) Pp. 113-136

https://doi.org/10.6656/MR.2004.23.4.CHI.113

摘要

高階主管的股票選擇權已經成為經理人薪資中相當重要的成分，本文比較三種誘因設計與兩種公司治理類型，觀察如何搭配誘因設計與治理結構可以產生最大的公司價值。相對極大公司價值的風險，選擇權契約會不會引發不當的風險決策，主要看經理人的風險規避程度，公司投資的技術與治理制度。模擬結果發現投資風險，離職金設計與公司治理制度具有密切的關係，經理人在從事投資決策時，會考慮誘因設計下的財富效果與公司治理下的固守職位效果後決定。尤其本文發現強勢的董事會監督對代理問題的解決，與誘因的設計方式間存有抵換關係。即當公司採用較一般誘因激勵的制度時（如紅利等），本文建議可以採用較為嚴格的公司治理制度；若公司採用如選擇權或回顧選擇權的誘因方式時，則不須採用嚴格的公司治理制度，否則將使經理人因為固守職位，而引發不利公司價值的代理問題。

關鍵字

投資風險 ； 治理結構 ； 離職金 ； 固守職位

並列摘要

Executive stock options have become an ever more important component of a manager's compensation. This paper compares three compensation contracts that will be the best design under strong and weak governance structures. We address how various mixtures of the components of a compensation package and the characteristics of the options affect the investment risk policy. Relative to the risk level that maximizes firm value, an option contract can induce too much or too little corporate risk-taking, depending on managerial risk aversion, the underlying investment technology and the governance structure. The results in our simulation reveal close relationship among investment risk, severance packages and governance structure. Managers will consider both wealth effect and entrenchment effect when they make investment decisions. We find there is trade-off relationship between severance packages and governance structure when the objective is to minimize the total cost to the firm. We suggest company to adopt strong governance structure when managers are motivated with bonus scheme, and weak governance structure when the managers are motivated with option-like severance packages; otherwise managers will be induced to entrench himself and to destroy the company value.

並列關鍵字

Investment Risk ； Corporate Governance Structure ； Severance Payment ； Entrenchment