經理人異動與股東財富效果

Management Turnover and Shareholder Wealth Effect

黃旭輝(Hsu-Huei Huang)

《管理評論》 25卷1期 (2006/01) Pp. 23-45

https://doi.org/10.6656/MR.2006.25.1.CHI.23

摘要

在所有權與經營權分離的體制下，經理人可能為了追求其個人的私利而犧牲了股東的利益，如何降低代理問題對股東造成的不利影響，一直是財務學者的努力方向，其中董事會解僱績效不佳的經理人便是可能的解決方案之一。本文探討經理人的異動宣告對股東財富的影響，研究樣本包括民國85年至91年上市公司的總經理異動之186個樣本，實證結果發現非自願性經理人異動在異動之前的經營績效相對較差且異動宣告的股東財富效果顯著為正，自願性經理人異動在異動之前的經營績效相對較佳且異動宣告的股東財富效果顯著為負，另外我們也發現，經營績效愈差、資訊不對稱愈大以及外國專業投資機構(QFII)持股愈多的公司，經理人異動的宣告效果愈好；而且，資訊不對稱愈大和QFII持股愈多的公司，非自願性經理人異動的宣告效果也愈好。最後，本文也發現非家族企業的非自願性異動與其前期績效不佳有較顯著的關聯。

關鍵字

經理人異動 ； 代理問題 ； 公司治理 ； 資訊不對稱

並列摘要

Separation of management and ownership, managers could pursue their private benefit at the expense of shareholders. How to mitigate the negative effect on owners due to agency problem is a central issue in financial literature. We study the impacts of CEO turnover on shareholder wealth, our sample includes 186 event companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange during 1996-2002. The results show that (1) forced CEO turnover is associated with worse prior performance and significantly positive announcement effect, and voluntary CEO turnover is opposite, (2) firms with worse performance, higher information asymmetry, and more QFII stockholding would get better announcement effect, (3) companies with higher information asymmetry, and more QFII stockholding incurring forced turnover would be accompanied with higher announcement effect, (4) forced CEO turnover of non-family business is related to prior bad performance.

並列關鍵字

management turnover ； agency problem ； corporate governance ； information asymmetry

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