本文的出發點是以下的經驗謎題:為何依契約聘僱的外勞被困在合法奴工的處境,反而是所謂的「逃跑外勞」在非法雇用關係中享有較高的薪資與較好的勞動條件?「逃跑外勞」的社會問題化,反映出台灣對於外籍客工的高壓控制與人身規訓。本文探討三個客工制度的主要控制機制及壓迫效果:一,台灣政府透過配額管制及權利收束來維持外籍客工在時間上的過渡性、空間上的固著性;二,短期客工的招募過程是高度商業化的、受跨國仲介業所主導;三,台灣政府剝奪移工在勞動力市場中流動的自由,將其分派在人身從屬的邊緣生產位置,也強化了仲介與雇主的鉗制力量。在這個高度管制的跨國勞動力市場裡,仲介交易的不只是勞動力,更包括配額、工作機會、護照等可轉換為高利潤的「虛擬商品」。對於移工來說,合法地位與契約關係,與其說提供了保護的措施,反而更接近協助奴役的機制。如此政策管制的結果是,處罰了依法工作的移工,並間接促成移工逃跑、追求法外自由的現象。
This paper departs from this empirical puzzle: Why are migrant contract workers trapped in a circumstance of ”legal servitude” as opposed to the situation that undocumented migrants gain higher wages and enjoy enlarged freedom? The problematization of ”runaway migrants” mirrors the stringent control and discipline imposed upon migrant workers in Taiwan. I underscore three major mechanisms of control in the ”guest worker” system: quota controls and other rules that render migrants transient and immobile; aggravated competition among recruitment agencies; and deprivation of the freedom for workers to transfer employers freely. In such a highly regulated market, multiple forms of ”fictitious commodities” have been created, such as quotas, job orders and passports. As a result, the state regulations punish those who abide by the law and induce the formation of irregular migration-undocumented migrants can escape the bondage of servitude and enjoy some ”free illegality” in unauthorized employment.