本研究之主要目的是探討借款企業的資訊透明度對於銀行放款契約類型選擇之影響。同時我們也從企業的觀點來探討企業選擇多家成單一(少數)銀行維持往來關係之影響因素,檢定是否支持單一銀行-資訊透明度假說與多家銀行-銀行財務危機假說。最後,本研究再探討環境競爭對於銀行承作關係型放款之影響。主要實證結果指出當借款企業的資訊透明度越低,則會降低大型銀行、外國銀行以及財務危機銀行的放款承作機率,這也代表減少關係型放款契約承作。另外,中小型企業會傾向與銀行建立少數銀行往來之關係,而當小型企業之首位融資銀行為財務危機銀行時,企業會傾向與多家銀行建立往來關係以保護自己。當產業環境競爭時,銀行承作關係型放款較有利,而與銀行建立密切往來關係的企業也可以獲得較佳的借款條件。
The primary purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of bank size, foreign ownership, and financial distress on relationship lending to informationally opaque small firms. We also discuss why firms choose single banking or multiple banking relationships and test the single-bank firm-opacity hypothesis and multiplebank bank-distress hypothesis. Last, we examine how competition influences relationship lending. The empirical results reveal that large banks, foreign banks, and banks in distress may have difficulties extending relationship loans to informationally opaque small firms. In addition, small firms tend to establish single banking relationship and small firms with the primary bank in financial distress are more likely to have multiple bank lenders to protect themselves. As the market is more competitive, banks would be better off for making relationship-based loan contracts, and firms with intense banking relationships would receive more favorable loan terms.
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