臺灣企業及其轉投資中國公司股權結構對經營績效與財務結構之影響

The Effect of Ownership Structure of Taiwan Enterprises and the Investment in Mainland China's Companies on Operating Performance and Financial Structure

陳宗成(Tsung-Cheng Chen) ； 簡金成(Chin-Chen Chien)

《財務金融學刊》 15卷3期 (2007/08) Pp. 113-145

https://doi.org/10.6545/JFS.2007.15(3).4

摘要

本研究探討臺灣企業之董監事股權結構及對中國轉投資涉入程度是否影響其經營績欲與財務槓桿。實證結果發現董監事股權結構和轉投資中國涉入程度皆對經營績效具顯著正相關，但對財務槓桿則皆呈現顯著之負相關，不僅符合利益收斂假說，也說明何以全灣企業不顧政府戒急用忍政策，核大對中國投資之涉入程度。當局在無法通阻企業西進之現實考量下，轉而提出有效開放，積極管理之政策，除了國安因素外，希望減少董監事利用轉投資中國大陸，進行利益輸送，掏空公司，以致出現損及全灣企業及小股東權益之現象。本研究進一步應用代理理論之架構，分析董監事持股率和轉投資中國涉入程度對經營績效和財務結構之相互影響：董監事持股率較低且轉投資中國涉入程度較淺之臺灣企業，其董監事可能較具充分誘因給兩岸投資資訊透明度不住之機會，從事自利之道德危機行為，導致經營績效較差，財務槓桿較高。本研究結果有助於有關當局在有效開放登陸投資的政策下，篩選積極管理對象。

關鍵字

董監事持股 ； 投資中國涉入程度

並列摘要

This study investigates the impact of ownership structure and investment in Mainland China's companies on operating performance and financial structure from the prospect of agency theory. Empirical results indicate that both the ownership structure and the investment in Mainland China's companies are positively correlated with operating performance, but negatively correlated with financial structure. These results are consistent with the argument about convergence of interest hypothesis. They also provide reasonable explanations why entrepreneurs keep on pouring their resources into Mainland China regardless of the conservative policies established by the Governmental agencies. The Government has been forced to change its policy toward ＂effective open, aggressive management＂ in order to prevent the fraud of transferring company's economic resources to individuals through Mainland China's companies. This study also investigates the cross effect of ownership structure and substance of investment in Mainland China. It shows that companies with higher agency problems tend to have poorer operating performance and higher financial leverage. Our empirical results provide valuable guidelines for the Administrations in screening the targeted companies that may need to enforce aggressive management.

並列關鍵字

Board Ownership ； Investment in Mainland China's Companies

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