本文調查392個美國案例在從事合併與收購之後的長期績效,樣本條、以主併及目標公司產業代碼(SIC codes)的前兩碼區分為混合性(Conglomerate)與非混合性(Non-conglomerate)購併;利用Berger and Ofek(1995)及Lamont and Polk(2002)所使用績效加以計算,發現從事混合性購併企業的績效有變差之傾向,從事非混合性購併企業的績效則大致保持原有水準,這些結果與多角化減損公司價值的論點一致。本文亦發現,混合性與非混合性主併公司的績效受不同構併特性影響,混合性主併公司的績效不住可用管理者的“傲慢(Hubris)”解釋;另一方面,非混合性主併公司若以現金支付購併費用,長期表現較佳,但若購併高益本比之目標公司,則長期績效不佳。
This study investigates the long-run performance of 392 US cases of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We define a conglomerate (non-conglomerate) M&A when the acquirer and target have different (the same) 2-digit SIC codes. Using Berger and Ofek's (1995) and Lamont and Polk's (2002) measures, we find that conglomerate acquirers are prone to underperform after M&As while non-conglomerate acquirers perform about the same as they did . These results are consistent with the argument that diversification mitigates the firm value. We also find that conglomerate and non-conglomerate acquirers' performance are associated with different M&A characteristics. Conglomerate acquirers' underperformance can be explained by managers' "hubris." On the other hand, non-conglomerate acquirers who paid cash tend to perform well after M&As, while those who buy high earnings-yield targets tend to perform poorly.
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