台灣自民國91年起便針對初次申請上市上櫃公司要求設立獨立董監事,並於民國96年起擴大涵蓋範圍至全體上市上櫃公司。為瞭解上市公司對於新制的適應程度與檢驗企業設置獨立董監制度,可否為其多重利害關係人治理程度、市場績效與會計績效帶來正面的提昇,並調查獨立董監特性和公司治理或公司績效之關係,本文以民國91年至95年上市公司作為研究對象,利用最小平方法逐年進行橫斷面之實證討論。結果顯示:公司設置獨立董事不僅可顯著提升多重利害關係人之治理分數,也有益於市場績效與會計績效,惟審計委員會的安排對於治理程度及績效表現多存有顯著的負面影響。公司在遴選獨立董事人選時,可考慮聘僱持股率低之人士或留任既有的獨立董事,同時藉由增加獨立董事在董事會之席次比率來強化其獨立性;獨立職能監察人之尋找則可鎖定在女性、在任期間長與教育程度高之人士來擔任,以增進公司之治理程度與提升經營績效。至於現存法規在專業性之要求則不見得有益於多重利害關係人之治理程度與公司經營績效。
In Taiwan, companies that have attempted to apply for initial public offering have been demanded to set up their independent directors and supervisors since 2002. The existing listed companies have also been required to meet the same regulation since January 1, 2007. However, no study has been commissioned to analyze the pros and cons of this new policy in detail. Hence, this paper used the ordinary least square method to investigate the impact of the systems of independent directors and supervisors on multi-stakeholders governance and corporate performance. It also examined whether independent directors' and supervisors' characteristics are related to corporate governance or performance. The samples used in this study consist of all listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE). The empirical results show that the system of independent directors can significantly enhance multi-stakeholders governance and bring out benefits on market performance and accounting performance. On the contrary, audit committee has significantly negative effect on governance and performance. This paper also reveals that companies prefer appointing individuals who have less stock ownership or are experienced board members as independent directors. Alternatively, the paper recommends that companies should increase the board seat ratio of independent directors to enhance their independence. Regarding the independent supervisors of the companies, the results show that women or those individuals with higher education level or experienced board members could promote the corporate governance and performance. The requirements for the independent director and independent supervisor to have work experience or expertise in commerce, law, accounting, finance or otherwise necessary for the business of the company are not necessarily beneficial to improving multi-stakeholder governance and performance.