股權私募之折價因素：資訊假說之再檢視

私募制度之引進係在提供企業迅速之籌資管道，有別於公開募集資金，私募排除現有股東優先認購權利，因此當私募股權折價幅度愈高，原有股東權益將嚴重稀釋。由於私募股權價格決定於特定人士與公司之彼此協商，回歸私募制度本意係提供企業資金募集管道，特定人士進行私募價格之議定應以公司價值為考量依據，並適度調整相關成本；據此，本文延續Hertzel and Smith（1993）之資訊假說概念，探究私募價格與股價間之折價產生是否因內外部公司治理機制之良窳而異。本文實證結果顯示，在外部公司治理之專業準則規範下，無形項目之資訊內涵將因不同會計處理產生差異，其中費用化之無形項目對股權折價幅度具有顯著正向影響，亦即研發投入愈大，股權折價幅度愈大，此結果可視為無形項目的費用化處理對於投資人進行價值評估時產生一定程度的評價困難。再者，當私募企業之管理者以影響現金流量之資產處分損益進行盈餘管理行為時，管理程度愈大，股權折價幅度亦愈小；但投資處分損益則加劇投資人與公司間資訊不對稱程度。至於董監事組成中獨立董監席次以及股權結構之董監持股比率與董監質押行為皆對股權折價產生預期影響。綜合言之，外部與內部公司治理機制皆對資訊品質產生一定程度之影響。

關鍵字

股權私募折價；資訊不對稱；無形項目；盈餘管理；公司治理

並列摘要

The mechanism of private equity placement in Taiwan provides firms with a more convenient way to raise their funds. With regard to its essence, the mechanism is introduced to offer a fund raising avenue to firms with difficulties in raising funds through public issues. The offering price shall be determined based on firm value through negotiation between the offerees and the firm. As a result, this study, extending Hertzel and Smith's (1993) information hypothesis, investigates whether the discount of private equity placement is affected by the information quality proxied by the magnitude of intangibles investment, firms' earnings management behavior, and governance structure. The empirical findings of this study document that the magnitude of intangibles investment measured by research and development expenditure is positively related to the discount of private equity placement. In addition, the firm managers' earnings management behavior proxied by gain (or loss) on sale of assets is negatively related to the discount. In contrast, gain (or loss) on sale of investment has a positive impact. Finally, ratio of independent directors and supervisors over board size, the directors' and supervisors' shareholdings and the percentage of the directors' and supervisors' shareholdings that are pledged have significant impacts on the discount of private equity placement. In sum, corporate governance mechanism, internal or external, does affect on the quality of accounting information provided by a firm.

並列關鍵字

Discount of Private Equity Placement ； Information Asymmetry ； Intangibles ； Earnings Management ； Corporate Governance

參考文獻

邱正仁、熊大中、高蘭芬(2002)。股權質押與財務危機關聯性之研究。中華會計學刊。3(1)，79-111。

范宏書、陳慶隆、廖英任(2008)。盈餘管理對會計資訊的相對價值攸關性之影響。管理與系統。15(1)，93-136。

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股權私募之折價因素：資訊假說之再檢視

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