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組建「巡邏隊」-中共中央與省級紀檢菁英結構與流動分析

Forming the CCP's "Police Patrols": The CCDI and Provincial CDIs Elite Structure and Mobility in China

Abstracts


中國共產黨紀律檢查委員會(簡稱紀檢)與黨委員會(簡稱黨委)同為中國共產黨全國代表大會選舉產生,兼具政治與專業性,雖然在階層化的晉升競賽中並非屬於領先群,但中央卻有賴紀檢系統作為「巡邏隊」來監督部門與地方等「代理人」。本文主要檢視江澤民到習近平時期,中央與地方紀檢菁英結構與流動,試圖找出菁英結構背後的政策與制度關聯,同時也探討紀檢菁英的背景與經歷對政策執行的影響。從鄧小平恢復中央紀律檢查委員會(簡稱「中紀委」)到習近平推動國家監察體制改革,都顯示紀檢系統與核心領導人的密切關係。本文發現自江澤民時期,雖然開始推動中紀委的接班梯隊與專業化,也開始推動地方幹部的交流。不過,制度的擴散主要歷經胡錦濤到習近平的任期,包括紀檢全面駐點、紀檢與其他重要分口的連結,最終到國家監察委的建立。加上省級紀委書記的提名朝「異地交流」與「中央空降」為主流,將省級紀委書記由地方黨委任命的代理人,改造為中央監督地方黨委的巡邏隊。

Parallel abstracts


The Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI) and the Party Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are both elected by the Party Congress. Although the CDI elites are not the leading group in the promotion competition, but they have gradually become the key to CCP's internal control over the cadres ever since the era of Deng Xiaoping. In order to discover differences in the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and Provincial CDI elites structure and mobility of Xi and his predecessors Jiang and Hu, this research collected and reviewed data on the personnel reshuffling of the CCDI and provincial secretaries of CDI, and to identify institutions or policies as key independent variables in explaining the elite mobility. This analysis contends that when it came to reforming the professionalism and succession in echelon of CCDI and the process for nominating provincial secretaries of CDI as early as Jiang Zemin's tenure. However, it was not until the period of Hu and Xi, that more than 90% of selection and appointment approaches were either through office exchanges between different locations or direct planting from the party center. The more frequent switching of the discipline-inspection secretaries of provincial commissions indicates that the center has become more reliant on discipline inspection commissions to monitor governments and party committees. Each of the above steps reflected a strong inclination to dictate the selection process for personnel reshufflings at all levels of the CDI in Xi's period.

Parallel keywords

Agent CCDI Elite Provincial Secretaries of CDI Xi Jinping

References


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