許多人認爲,傾向於多數決選制的並立式單一選區兩票制不利小黨生存。其理由在於,小黨潛在的支持者在單一選區的選舉中採取了策略性投票,把選票轉給比較有希望勝選的大黨。本論文認爲,正是因爲策略選民在單一選區犧牲了小黨,所以小黨可以利用策略選民的補償心理,藉由參與單一選區選舉來鞏固其比例代表選舉的得票。不過,選民的補償心理因選區而異,小黨應該選擇選民比較不受恩庇體系所影響的選區參與單一選區的選舉。本論文以日本實施單一選區兩票制的四次眾議院大選爲案例,以單一選區爲分析單位,探討小黨如何選擇特定的單一選區參選,以達到「以輸爲贏」的目的。結果發現,選區的世襲議員人數越少、當選者的當選次數越少、策略投票的傾向越明顯、都市化程度越高、比例代表區的平均應選名額越多,小黨就越可能參與區域選舉,並導致參選人數的增加。這些發現透露了日本的小黨如何在對其不利的選制下求生存,也解釋了小黨爲何不若某些「感染效果」理論所預期地在大多數選區參選。本論文也說明,小黨在日本的單一選區兩票制下之所以能採取此種參選策略,和該國劃分出11個比例代表區有密切的關係。反觀選制和日本類似的台灣,全國只有一個比例代表區,小黨即使採取犧牲打的策略,換得的第二票也因選區過大而被稀釋,難以跨過當選門檻。
Our intuition suggests that a mixed-member majoritarian system is unfavorable to minor parties, a situation caused by strategic voting in the single-member district races. This article argues that, exactly because of strategy voting, minor parties can participate in the single-member district competitions in exchange for the vote cast by the strategic voters in the race of the proportional representation (PR) tier. Even so, minor parties should be selective of the single-member district races to place their candidate, because strategic voting in some constituencies has been weakened by forces like clientelism. To identify the single-member districts where minor parties are most likely to place a candidate, this paper studies Japan's four House of Representatives elections held under the mixed-member majoritarian system. The major finding is that, at the district level, the number of candidates increases with the tendency of strategic voting, the degree of urbanization, and the average district magnitude of PR competition; it is negatively associated with the existence of second-generation candidates and the seniority of the winner. These results confirm the hypothesis about the candidate-placement strategy of minor parties, and explain why minor parties do not nominate candidates indiscriminately as some contamination effects theories expect. Since Japan's PR seats are elected in 11 blocks, minor parties can easily spot the areas where they can attract the compensatory votes. That is why minor parties in Taiwan, which used the same electoral system for the recent legislative election but had all PR seats allocated on a nationwide list, did not follow the Japanese strategy to boost their PR votes.
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