透過您的圖書館登入
IP:3.91.43.22
  • 期刊

以輸爲贏:小黨在日本單一選區兩票制下的參選策略

To Lose Is to Win: The Candidate-Placement Strategy of Minor Parties under Japan's Mixed-Member Majoritarian System

摘要


許多人認爲,傾向於多數決選制的並立式單一選區兩票制不利小黨生存。其理由在於,小黨潛在的支持者在單一選區的選舉中採取了策略性投票,把選票轉給比較有希望勝選的大黨。本論文認爲,正是因爲策略選民在單一選區犧牲了小黨,所以小黨可以利用策略選民的補償心理,藉由參與單一選區選舉來鞏固其比例代表選舉的得票。不過,選民的補償心理因選區而異,小黨應該選擇選民比較不受恩庇體系所影響的選區參與單一選區的選舉。本論文以日本實施單一選區兩票制的四次眾議院大選爲案例,以單一選區爲分析單位,探討小黨如何選擇特定的單一選區參選,以達到「以輸爲贏」的目的。結果發現,選區的世襲議員人數越少、當選者的當選次數越少、策略投票的傾向越明顯、都市化程度越高、比例代表區的平均應選名額越多,小黨就越可能參與區域選舉,並導致參選人數的增加。這些發現透露了日本的小黨如何在對其不利的選制下求生存,也解釋了小黨爲何不若某些「感染效果」理論所預期地在大多數選區參選。本論文也說明,小黨在日本的單一選區兩票制下之所以能採取此種參選策略,和該國劃分出11個比例代表區有密切的關係。反觀選制和日本類似的台灣,全國只有一個比例代表區,小黨即使採取犧牲打的策略,換得的第二票也因選區過大而被稀釋,難以跨過當選門檻。

並列摘要


Our intuition suggests that a mixed-member majoritarian system is unfavorable to minor parties, a situation caused by strategic voting in the single-member district races. This article argues that, exactly because of strategy voting, minor parties can participate in the single-member district competitions in exchange for the vote cast by the strategic voters in the race of the proportional representation (PR) tier. Even so, minor parties should be selective of the single-member district races to place their candidate, because strategic voting in some constituencies has been weakened by forces like clientelism. To identify the single-member districts where minor parties are most likely to place a candidate, this paper studies Japan's four House of Representatives elections held under the mixed-member majoritarian system. The major finding is that, at the district level, the number of candidates increases with the tendency of strategic voting, the degree of urbanization, and the average district magnitude of PR competition; it is negatively associated with the existence of second-generation candidates and the seniority of the winner. These results confirm the hypothesis about the candidate-placement strategy of minor parties, and explain why minor parties do not nominate candidates indiscriminately as some contamination effects theories expect. Since Japan's PR seats are elected in 11 blocks, minor parties can easily spot the areas where they can attract the compensatory votes. That is why minor parties in Taiwan, which used the same electoral system for the recent legislative election but had all PR seats allocated on a nationwide list, did not follow the Japanese strategy to boost their PR votes.

參考文獻


盛治仁(2006)。單一選區兩票制對未來臺灣政黨政治發展之可能影響探討。臺灣民主季刊。3(2),63-86。
王鼎銘(2004)。日本自民黨之選票穩定度研究:1993、1996及2000年眾議院選舉之定群追蹤。選舉研究。11(2),81-109。
謝相慶(1999)。日本眾議院議員新選舉制度及其政治效應-以1996年選舉爲例。選舉研究。6(2),45-87。
黃紀、王鼎銘、郭銘峰(2005)。日本衆議院1993及1996年選舉-自民黨之選票流動分析。人文及社會科學集刊。17(4),853-883。
Alesina, Alberto,Howard Rosenthal(1995).Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

被引用紀錄


林欣儀(2017)。立法院選舉採聯立制之可行性評估〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342%2fNTU201703291
鐘晨維(2017)。2014年日本眾議院選舉-核能對自民黨得票影響之空間分析〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342%2fNTU201700715
范恩邦(2014)。臺灣單一選區兩票制之研究:以第七、八屆立委選舉為例〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342%2fNTU.2014.10231
松倉千賀(2013)。台灣與日本農業政策決策機制 -以加入WTO前後稻米補貼政策為例-〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342%2fNTU.2013.02489
徐維遠(2012)。相對多數決制下為何小黨能生存?-英國與日本的比較分析〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342%2fNTU.2012.02280

延伸閱讀