On E0ffective Mutual and Hierarchical Monitoring: From a Historical Perspective

政治或商業之運作，都涉及代理問題。在政治界談的是制衡，商業界則是管理及控制。為了確保政府部會首長及公司執行長履行職務，監督措施確有必要，問題的癥結在對受僱者缺乏信任及訊息。古今中外，軍事或文官體系，曾經有不少有效的監察體系克服上述困境。完整的監督措施從用人開始，並及評鑑各受僱者之表現。若要看到效果，賞罰是必備的工具，而且要提高揭弊的機率。監察制度的重點在適當的賞罰及有效的控管。分析若干知名的監察制度，可以發現前人如何解決控制難題，並幫助我們了解其中涉及的誘因結構。另外，制度及組織的演進，可以由誘因的改變找到線索，反之亦然。

關鍵字

制衡；早期歐洲貿易公司；英國消費稅；監察；代理問題

並列摘要

The operation of a political regime or a business entity involves the principal-agent problem. Checks and balances are the theme in the political arena, while management and controlling are the routine in the business world. To ensure that the ministers or the executive officers perform the desired functions, a monitoring scheme may be helpful. The crux of the issue is the lack of trust and information on those employed. Various effective monitoring networks, occidental or oriental, ancient or modern, military or civilian, have been deployed by numerous regimes and organizations to overcome the difficulties. The monitoring proceedings start from recruiting to remunerating and evaluating the workforce. To be sure, carrot and stick must be applied to achieve desirable results, besides enhancing the probability of detecting frauds. The merits of those networks seem to lie in commensurate rewarding and punishing of the personnel. Analyzing how those monitoring networks solved the controlling issue may give us insights into the critical incentive structures embodied. Moreover, the evolutionary path of institutions and organizations could be delineated via discerning the changes of those incentives, and vice versa.

並列關鍵字

checks and balances ； early European trading company ； English excise taxation ； monitoring ； principal-agent problem

參考文獻

Allen, Douglas W.(1998).Compatible Incentives and the Purchase of Military Commissions.Journal of Legal Studies.27(1),45-66.

Google Scholar

Allen, Douglas W.(2002).The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail.Explorations in Economic History.39,204-31.