政治貪腐的制度理論：以亞洲各國為例的分析

An Institutional Approach to Political Corruption: Statistical Evidence from Asian Countries

林宗弘(Thung-Hong Lin) ； 韓佳(Jia Han)

《台灣政治學刊》 12卷1期 (2008/06) Pp. 53-99

https://doi.org/10.6683/TPSR.200806.12(1).53-99

摘要

為什麼貪腐在亞洲某些社會中橫行，卻在另一些社會中得到了有效的控制？本文提出了一個研究政治貪腐的制度主義觀點，我們收集了亞洲十一國的縱列數據(Panel data)與國際透明組織(Transparency International, TI)的貪腐印象指數(Corruption Perception Index, CPI)；並且引進Systematic GMM模型，希望對導致政治貪腐的因素提出亞洲的經驗證據。統計結果顯示，亞洲各國的經驗與全球的比較研究之間並沒有衝突，首先，我們發現威權主義與貧富差距將導致亞洲各國的政治貪腐程度顯著惡化。其次，相對於非民主體制，民主體制似乎更容易因不平等而導致政治貪腐。最後，我們發現以亞洲各國大專以上教育入學率來衡量的人力資本存量，似乎有助於提升公民社會對抗國家貪腐的能力。

關鍵字

政治貪腐 ； 新制度主義 ； 民主 ； 所得不平等 ； 人力資本

並列摘要

Why is corruption rife in some societies while it is seldom seen in others societies in East Asia? In the context of a neo-institutionalist framework, this study attempts to provide an empirical assessment of the source of corruption by using panel data for 11 East Asian economies over a 10-year period. Corruption is measured by the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) which is developed by Transparency International (TI). Given that changes in the CPI exhibits strong time-dependent properties, the systematic general method of moments (systematic GMM) approach is introduced in the analysis in order to acquire more consistent and unbiased results. We find that in parallel with studies for other regions, authoritarianism and income inequality are first of all the most robust factors leading to political corruption in East Asia. Secondly, the interaction between regime-type and inequality illustrates that, in terms of corruption, democracy more easily suffers from inequality than authoritarianism. Finally, the stock of human capital measured by the enrolled rate of tertiary education tends to enhance the capacity of civil society to guard itself against corruption.

並列關鍵字

political corruption ； Neo-institutionalism ； democracy ； income inequality ； human capital

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