台灣社會福利民營化的未預期後果：地方政府相關人員「官僚自主性」的初步闡釋的

The Unintended Consequences of Welfare Privatization in Taiwan: A Preliminary Study on Bureaucratic Autonomy

王篤強(Duu-Chiang Wang) ； 高迪理(Ti-Li Dan Kao) ； 吳秀照(Shiou-Chao Wu)

《社會政策與社會工作學刊》 14卷2期 (2010/12) Pp. 91-146

https://doi.org/10.6785/SPSW.201012.0091

摘要

透過契約外包，提高政府效率、擴大民間參與作爲號召的民營化運動，在當代福利服務改革的過程中扮演了很重要的角色，它同時也對社會工作產生了許多影響。本文盼望籍由地方政府相關人員的訪談指出作爲工具來使用的民營化措施，它在台灣實踐過程中恰恰與西方「代理人理論」中預期藉此限制官僚自主性的理論期待相左。換言之，台灣的福利民營化非但沒有抑制了政府官僚介入的範園，反而保留了官僚行政裁量的空間。對此，我們認爲饒富興味，有必要特別指出來。

關鍵字

福利民營化 ； 契約外包 ； 官僚自主性 ； 社會工作

並列摘要

In the name of welfare privatization, there are so many changes in the deli very system of social services in Taiwan. It is claimed that public financial problems, social services quality, and citizen participation will be improved by the strategies of contracting out. According to Principal-Agent Theory, bureaucratic autonomy that is the main reason of services inefficiencies will be reduced by these strategies. However, we doubt this kind of argument. In our study, I intend to point out that the space of welfare bureaucracy will be expanded. Taiwan's government outsourcing experience is probably different from western. And these results are not so bad for us. It means that it is still possible that governmen outsourcing to NGOs/private sector is beneficial which is a good example of privatization on government policy, that will help improve the quality of service.

並列關鍵字

welfare privatization ； contracting out ； bureaucratic autonomy ； social service

參考文獻

黃源協、蕭文高(2006)。社會服務契約管理—台灣中部四縣市社會行政人員觀點之分析。臺大社會工作學刊。13，173-218。

劉淑瓊(2005)。績效、品質與消費者權益保障—論社會服務契約委託的責信課題。社會政策與社會工作學刊。9(2)，31-93。

劉淑瓊(2001)。社會服務「民營化」再探：迷思與現實。社會政策與社會工作學刊。5(2)，13-56。

Aberbach, J.,Rockman, B.(1997).Bureaucracy: Control, Responsiveness, Performance.Designs for Democratic Stability: Studies in Viable Constitutionalism.(Designs for Democratic Stability: Studies in Viable Constitutionalism).:

Alchian, A.,Demsetz, H.(1972).Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization.American Economic Review.62(4),777-795.