經理人固守職位行為對融資決策影響之研究

Managerial Entrenchment and Financing Decisions

詹家昌(Chia-Chung Chan) ； 許月瑜(Yueh-Yu Hsu)

《Asia Pacific Management Review》 4卷3期 (1999/09) Pp. 289-303

https://doi.org/10.6126/APMR.1999.4.3.06

摘要

本文主要研究經理人固守職位與資本結構的選擇，文中結果支持經理人為了固守職位將避免採用負債，在橫斷面的分析上，本文發現當經理人的股權愈大將可能使用較高的負債，當董事會規模愈大則可能降低負債水準。但當觀察負債水準的變動時，本文發現當前任經理人非自願離職時，經理人將顯著增加負債水準，在股東監督方面，則大股東加入對公司負債水準有顯著的影響。

關鍵字

固守職位 ； 資本結構

並列摘要

This paper studies the relationship between managerial entrenchment and firms' capital structures, with results suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. In a cross-sectional analysis, we find that the leverage levels are higher when CEOs possess higher stock ownership, but the leverage levels are lower when the size of the board is larger. In an analysis of leverage changes, we find that new CEOs tend to increase the leverage level after the involuntary departure of predecessor. In active monitoring, the addition to the board of major stockholders has significant effect on the leverage levels.

並列關鍵字

Entrenchment ； Capital Structure

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