"Participatory budgeting" in Wenling, Zhejiang, is a reform which has implications for a limited form of democracy. However, under the current authoritarian political structure, the democratic impact of such a reform can only be limited. But why would such a reform be adopted under an authoritarian regime? What strategies and measures did the local government which implemented this reform adopt? How did the local government control it? How did it benefit from it? And what was the impact of such a reform on the authoritarian rule of the local government? This article intends to answer these questions. The article points out that the reform was not adopted to cope with some urgent governance crisis. The regime allowed it to develop because it was helpful in constraining the power of local government and in easing the tension between the local government and society, which in turn stabilizes authoritarian rule. However, given the unreasonable fiscal structure of the local Chinese government structure, the macro-level political implications of "participatory budgeting" is still very limited.