The Disjointed Incrementalism in Pubic Administration-A Case Study of the US Anti-Corruption Policy

漸進理論在公共行政領域的實踐：以美國反貪腐政策爲例

葛傳宇(Chuan-Yu Ernie Ko)

《公共事務評論》 8卷1期 (2007/06) Pp. 89-109

https://doi.org/10.29622/JPAR.200706.0005

摘要

貪污以賄賂行爲最爲常見。先進國家往往有雙重標準，嚴禁企業向本國官員行賄卻容忍甚至鼓勵企業賄賂外國官員以換取商業利益。本研究分析美國之反賄賂立法政策之動態演化過程，研究對象以一九七七年美國海外貪腐行爲法爲主，大膽假設並驗證美國政府爲政策創新者，促使先進國家進行長達十年之國際談判，進而提升已開發國家之商業道德並強化國際法治水準。 本文研究主張美國反貪腐政策爲無條理漸進理論之應用代表作。由於決策者漠視（或無法預見）決策後果以及無預警之焦點事件，使得美國公共政策學者大膽歸納絕大多數的政策都是無條理漸進理論。其次，本文主張美國反貪腐行爲法的法律名稱本身就具強有力的象徵意義，因爲反貪具道德正當性，師出有名，一旦法令出台，無法收回。儘管該法施行初期遭遇美國國內利益團體極大反彈，立法者沒有廢法的餘地，只能以修法限縮解釋賄賂行爲之定義與類型，作爲替代性的方案。第三，本政策從一開始的極端理想主義色彩轉向現實主義，挽救美國形象已非法律的主要保護法益，歷年來的兩次修法顯示政策像鐘擺一樣，在公平與效率之間擺盪。 本研究嘗試驗證以醜聞爲主的焦點事件是導致美國反貪腐立法呈現無條理變革的主因，並且因此產生外溢效應，導致促成OECD組織的先進國家成員簽署供應方的國際反貪腐公約。然而美國作爲國內與國際反賄賂立法的先驅者未必確保其享有預期的理想結局。歷年來，透明國際組織公佈的行賄者指數排行榜，美國仍落後於大多數歐洲國家。美國立法的先進性與其國際形象有重大落差，顯示徒法不足以自行，執法面仍有相當大的改善空間。 本研究之貢獻在於首次將公共政策學的漸進理論引進立法政策，跨學科領域的整合研究，有助於建立一套有系統有脈絡的分析架構，更精確的了解反貪腐政策的本質與特性。

關鍵字

貪腐 ； 美國海外反貪腐行爲法 ； OECD反貪腐公約 ； 漸進理論 ； 透明國際

並列摘要

This paper analyzes the dynamic evolution of the anti-bribery policy, in the context of the Foreign Corruption Practice Act (FCPA), and identifies the US government as the key policy entrepreneur behind the international negotiations in raising higher business ethics among developed countries and strengthening international rule of law.
This paper argues that the US anti-corruption policy is an appropriate representative of the disjointed incrementalism due to the ignorance of consequences and unexpected focusing events. Secondly, the title of the FCPA is a powerful symbol which no one can deny its justification (Stone 1997). Instead of abolishing the law, policy makers have to find alternatives to meet the demand of interest groups which are unhappy about the law. Thirdly, this anti-bribery policy evolves from an idealistic approach to a realistic approach. As time goes by, saving American image is no longer the predominant factor behind the law. The goal of the policy shows a pendulum effect swinging between fairness (equal rule of law) and efficiency (profit maximization).
This paper finds that focusing events, mainly political scandals, contribute greatly to the disjoining change of US anti-corruption legislation and to the making of a supply-side international anti-bribery treaty, i.e. the OECD Convention. However, being a pioneer in leading domestic and international legislation in anti-bribery does not guarantee an optimal outcome.
The results of this supply-side anti-corruption policy and practice are mixed. From the perspectives of institutionalization, the US is successful in both producing the OECD Convention and harmonizing its domestic legislation, the FCPA, with this Convention. These legislative moves indeed level the playing field in institutionalizing global business ethics, but the original legislative intent of saving the American image abroad is not in par with the legislative success. The US is still lagging behind 11 industrialized countries in the ranking of Bribe Payers Index, which was published by Transparency International. The low ranking reflects the fact that international perceptions of American business practices in 15 emerging markets around the world are incompatible with its progressive legislation. The gap between the letter of the law and business ethics in practice present a challenge for US policy makers to articulate and design a follow-up policy in enforcement.

並列關鍵字

corruption ； the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act FCPA ； OECD anti-bribery Convention ； incrementalism ； Transparency International