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Perspective Taking Representation of Bilateral Negotiation: Total Ignorance or Partial Ignorance of the Other's Perspective?
雙邊協商中的觀點採用：完全忽略或部分忽略對方的觀點？
摘要
所謂知己知彼百戰百勝。在協商過程中，若協商者可以事先洞悉對方的想法，則對於協商者是非常有利的。此文的目的在於探討：在雙邊協商(bilateral negotiation)的情境中，協商兩造採用對方觀點(perspective taking)評估協商相關資訊的過程。觀點忽略(Perspective ignorance)假設認為協商者會完全忽略對方的觀點。因為當協商情境出現資訊不對稱(information asymmetry)的現象時（例如買方不知道底價而賣方知道），協商者並不會將這個重要訊息納入考量之內，而誤以為對方所擁有的資訊與自己一樣。然而，我們可以常常觀察到，資訊弱勢的一方常會採取某種自我保護措施（例如買方不會完全相信賣方的說詞）所以在本文中，作者提出“直觀觀點基模”(naїve perspective taking schema)的概念，來描述協商者模擬對方觀點的過程。在協商者所建構的“直觀觀點基模”當中，協商者仍保留部分（雖然不是完全）對方的觀點。直觀觀點基模至少包含：對方的立場以及對方可以接受的可行方案的範圍。 本研究執行兩個實驗來驗證直觀觀點基模的解釋力。實驗的結果顯示：一、在雙邊協商的情境中，協商者試圖在兩個不同的立場中取得平衡妥協，所以中間點是最常見的協商方案。顯示直觀基模中的確存在，因為協商者清楚知道兩造不同的立場。二、在不同的利潤情境中，（但事實上期望利潤是一樣的）買方妥協的程度不同。當可能產生高利潤時，買方較願意妥協。顯示協商者知道對方可以接受的可行方案的範圍。三、回饋資訊不能降低資訊不對稱所產生的偏誤，但是回饋資訊可以降低上述的利潤情境效應。顯示回饋資訊對不同的觀點資訊影響不同。本研究的結果顯示，協商者縱然無法完全採用對方的觀點來理解協商的各種相關資訊，但是協者仍然部分保留，而非全然的忽略，對方的觀點。
並列摘要
If negotiators are able to take the perspective of the other side, efficient settlements of negotiation are more likely to be achieved. The purpose of this study is to investigate the process of perspective taking in the situation of bilateral negotiations. The perspective ignorance view argues that negotiators totally ignore the perspective of the other side because information asymmetry is not included in their understanding of the negotiation situation. However, information asymmetry is not the only perspective information. In this paper, the weak version of perspective ignorance view proposes that people only partially ignore the perspective of the other side by retaining perspective information other than information asymmetry, such as the different position of the other side, and the possible range of solutions acceptable by the other side. The representation of this partial perspective taking is called the ”naїve perspective taking schema”. Two experiments were conducted to examine this weak version of perspective ignorance view. First, the results showed that in bilateral negotiations, the mid-point was the price offered by the buyer to acquire a company with an uncertain value. This result suggested that the negotiators were aware of the different positions of both sides because they tried to compromise between the opposing positions. Secondly, the buyer gave in to the position of the seller to different extents in different profit situations. When the buyer expected to make more profit, they were willing to offer higher prices to achieve an agreement even though the expected value of the negotiated commodity was the same. This result suggested that the buyer was aware of the range of alternatives acceptable by the seller. Thirdly, feedback information did not reduce the bias produced from ignoring information asymmetry. However, feedback information indeed reduced the bias produced from the profit situation effect as formerly stated. The result suggested that there were different kinds of perspective information other than information asymmetry because feedback information has different effects on different kinds of perspective information.
參考文獻
延伸閱讀
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