Jürgen Habermas試圖透過程序主義之途徑來解決多元社會中法正當性的難題,亦即解決民主與正義問之衝突。就Habermas而言,法之正當性係繫於民主之立法程序。但其理論同時預設了正確遵循民主之立法程序的結果或多或少理性上是可以接受的。但在多元社會中,何以吾人可以期待具有不同且通常是不相容之價值傾向的自由、平等公民,能就什麼是平等對所有人是善達成共識,卻深受質疑。本文即就此理論爭議之反省、分析。本文之討論共分為如下幾個部分:(1)闡釋Habermas之程序主義法正當性理論的要旨及特點,藉以了解上揭問題在其法正當性理論脈絡中之位置。(2)以Thomas McCarthy之批判為主,論述Habermas上述理論預設在多元社會所可能遭遇之難題。(3)闡論McCarthy等之批判倘若成立,對Habermas之法正當性理論所可能造成之根本性的打擊。(4)從不同層次來分析McCarthy等之批判是否真的成立,或者說在那一個層次上成立。
In the context of complex, pluralistic contemporary societies, law's legitimacy seems to require sacrificing either democracy or justice. Habermas's proceduralist paradigm of law offers a way to resolve the conflict between democracy and justice. For Habermas, the legitimacy of law is tied to democratic decision-making procedures which warrant a presumption that procedurally correct outcomes are likely to be rationally acceptable outcomes. However, in the pluralist society, on what grounds, could we expect free and equal citizens with different and often incompatible value orientations to be able regularly to achieve consensus on what is equally good for all? That's the question that critics have raised, and this paper tries to approach and explore. In section 1, I shall attempt to examine some of the most salient general features of Habermas's proceduralist paradigm of law as a means to provide a context to understand how the question raised above go to the heart of Habermas's discourse-theoretical justification of law. In section 2, the exploration of the question presented by critics, especially Thomas McCarthy, will be undertaken. Following this, I will focus on the crises that Habermas's approach confronts, assuming the challenge is valid. Finally, I take a more close look at the same question discussed in section 2 and provide an assessment.
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