法律的根據與法律義務的性質

The Grounds of Law and the Nature of Legal Obligation

王鵬翔(Peng-Hsiang Wang)

《政治與社會哲學評論》 65期 (2018/06) Pp. 89-152

https://doi.org/10.6523/SOCIETAS.201806_(65).002

摘要

法律實證論與非實證論的傳統爭論，近來常被視為關於法律根據的爭議。本文指出，這個爭議的來源之一是雙方關於法律義務的性質有不同的看法。實證論者認為，法律義務是一種特定觀點下的義務，它只具有擬似而非真正的規範性；非實證論者則認為法律義務是一種真正的義務，它乃是一種來自於法律實踐的道德義務。本文試圖辯護非實證論的法律義務觀，並說明何以構成法律實踐的社會事實或制度行動具有影響或改變道德義務的規範重要性：它們透過改變相關事實或情境，來影響我們所擁有的規範理由，並以此形塑了道德義務的內容。

關鍵字

法律實證論／非實證論 ； 法律與道德 ； 法律的根據 ； 義務 ； 規範性 ； 理由

並列摘要

Recently, the debate between legal positivism and non-positivism has been framed as a controversy about the grounds of law. This article points out that the controversy results from their disagreement about the nature of legal obligation. According to legal positivism, legal obligations as obligations from the legal point of view are apparently rather than genuinely normative. By contrast, non-positivism holds that legal obligations are genuine obligations, i.e., moral obligations generated by our legal practices. This article defends a non-positivist view of legal obligation and attempts to explain the normative impact of social facts or institutional actions which constitute legal practices: Legal practices affect our normative reasons by changing the relevant facts and circumstances, thereby shaping the content of moral obligations.

並列關鍵字

legal positivism/non-positivism ； law and morality ； the grounds of law ； obligations ； normativity ； reasons

參考文獻

Correira, Fabrice and Benjamin Schneider. 2012. “Grounding: An opinionated introduction,” in Fabrice Correira and Benjamin Schneider eds., Metaphysical Grounding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-37.

Dancy, Jonathan. 2004. Ethics without Principles. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Enoch, David. 2011. “Reason-Giving and the Law,” in Leslie Green and Brian Leiter eds., Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law: vol.1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-38.

Essert, Christopher. 2016. “A Theory of Legal Obligation,” in Wil Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa eds., The Legacy of Ronald Dworkin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 245-272.

Greenberg, Mark. 2004. “How Facts Make Law,” Legal Theory 10(3): 157-198.