以生物武器嚇阻中國之軍事經濟分析

A Military Economic Analysis of Using Biological Weapons to Deter China

曾偉君(Wei-Chun Tseng) ； 黃思蘋(Shi-Ping Huang)

《全球政治評論》 13期 (2006/01) Pp. 41-70

https://doi.org/10.29899/JRM.200601.0003

摘要

許多研究認為若是在台灣單獨對抗中國的情況下，戰敗是遲早的事。目前中國的整體經濟實力約是台灣的五倍，且差距日漸擴大；而台灣的軍事投資以向外軍購為主，不具備使經濟成長的效果，因此若欲以大幅提高傳統武器軍事投資占國民所得之比重，做為軍事安全的唯一手段，則將犧牲經濟成長，導致與中國整體經濟實力差距加速擴大的惡性循環。因此本文探討以生物武器作為嚇阻工具，應用Stauvermann的重複序列賽局衝突模型，套用台灣與中國的經濟實力，並加入戰損，計算兩岸發生戰爭的可能性，區別和平與戰爭的範園。我們發現以生物武器嚇阻中國是可能成功的。此結果或可作為我方尋求其他安全手段，例如兩岸談判或強化台美日軍事對話，的一個籌碼。

關鍵字

生物武器 ； 衝突模型 ； 序列賽局 ； 戰損 ； 嚇阻 ； 戰略安全

並列摘要

Taiwan and China have some subtle relationships. The trades and investments between Taiwan and China have being increasing significantly since 1980s. However, China never gives up using forces to attack Taiwan. So people in Taiwan live on a knife-edge between peace and war. The militarily strength is proportional to the Economic strength. China's economy is about five times of Taiwan's, and the gap is increasing. Purely relying on the tradition weapons is not sufficient to protect Taiwan. Biological weapons are powerful and hard to be uncovered. Taiwan has the necessary biological, medical, and scientific technologies to develop and deploy biological weapons. Thus this thesis applies game theories to investigate the possibility of using biological weapons to deter China and to maintain the peace. The games used are a basic sequential game, a sequential game with asymmetric information, and Peter Stauvermann's repeated sequential game conflict model. Taiwan's GDP and China's GDP are adopted to evaluate the possibilities of war and peace. Attritions are incorporated into the model to make the model more realistic. Both tradition wars and biological wars are simulated. We found that in many situations, the tremendous loss of the biological war can deter the ambition of the relatively strong party, China, to start a war. Using biological weapons to maintain peace is feasible. This results can help Taiwan on the negotiations with China even Taiwan does not develop biological weapons, as long as Taiwan is able to develop such weapons secretly and in no time.

並列關鍵字

biological weapons ； collaboration model ； sequential games ； attrition ； deterrence ； strategic security