從美國經驗看立法院與朝野政黨在兩岸協商經合協議的角色

The Role of ROC's Legislative Yuan and Political Parties in the Cross-Strait Negotiations on Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement from the Perspective of American Experience

陳一新(Edward I-Hsin Chen)

《臺灣民主季刊》 6卷1期 (2009/03) Pp. 177-184

https://doi.org/10.6448/TDQ.200903.0177

摘要

近月以來，持續在國內朝野政黨與立法院發燒的議題，莫過於「兩岸經合架構協議」。反對黨與立法院都聲稱，在該項協議簽署之前，立法院必須先審查，再由兩岸簽署這項協議，也就是所謂的「先審後簽」。由民進黨帶頭的反對黨，甚至宣稱要發動公投杯葛「兩岸經合架構協議」。惟根據美國經驗，行政部門永遠不會在與其他國家談判之前將協議或條約送交參議院審查。只有在美國政府與外國完成談判之後，美國參院才會對協議或條約進行實質審查。如果參議院對協議或條約不滿意，可以否決或擱置。例如，威爾遜總統提出的「國際聯盟」，就遭到參院否決；卡特總統的「二號限武條約」則遭參院擱置。不過，這並不意味行政部門可以忽視立法部門的存在。在談判兩岸經合協議之前，行政院就有必要先與立法院、朝野政黨充分溝通，盡可能瞭解各方對兩岸經合協議的立場，在國內取得「多數共識」。馬英九總統也應該靈活運用他的地位、聲望、權威、政治技巧，以及說服的權力，來說服自己的官員、國會、朝野政黨立委、人民、媒體與相關各行各業，接受「兩岸經合架構協議」。

關鍵字

經濟合作架構協議ECFA ； 行政院 ； 立法院 ； 美國總統 ； 美國參院

並列摘要

Political parties, Legislative Yuan and Executive Yuan have been involved in a controversial issue in recent months as to whether Taiwan needs to sign an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with Mainland China. Both the opposition parties and the Legislative Yuan claim that Taiwan and China can sign such an agreement only after the legislative branch has a review on it. The opposition parties, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), even proclaim that they will call for a referendum to boycott the ECFA. According to American experience, the executive branch never submits an agreement or a treaty to the Senate for ratification before negotiating with other countries. In other words, the U.S. Senate can substantially review an agreement or a treaty only after the government finalizes the negotiations with other governments. If the Senate is not satisfied with the agreement or the treaty, it can either reject it or put it aside, as shown in the cases of League of Nations in the Wilson administration and SALT II in the Carter administration respectively. Nevertheless, this author does not imply that the executive branch can ignore the existence of legislative branch and political parties. Instead, Taiwan's Executive Yuan must make good use of its channels to communicate with Legislative Yuan and opposition parties to seek for the so-called ”majority consensus” as possible as it can. Likewise, President Ma Ying-jeou must wisely use his position, prestige, political techniques, and most importantly, power of persuasion to convince his officials, his party’s legislators, opposition legislators, media and representatives of related business circles to embrace the ECFA.

並列關鍵字

Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement ECFA ； Executive Yuan ； Legislative Yuan ； U. S. president ； U.S. Senate

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