馬英九總統自2008年5月上任以來,積極致力於兩岸關係的改善,久已冰封的我國海基及大陸海協兩會的協商機制,又重新啟動,陸續已舉辦四次的江丙坤與陳雲林之會談,也達成有關三通、直航及經貿方面的一些協議,目前正甚囂塵上的議題,就是所謂的「兩岸經濟合作架構協議」(Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, ECFA),似正要進入緊鑼密鼓、準備簽約的階段;但國內的反對聲浪不歇,媒體所反映民意的疑慮與困惑不斷;做爲全國唯一民意機關的立法院,在這些牽涉台灣人民重大權益的兩岸協商、協定過程中,曾試圖如何監督?監督的困境爲何?又該如何在困境中監督?是本文的關切及探討重點。
President Ma Ying-jeou has been endeavoring to smooth cross-strait relations since he was inaugurated in May 2008. The then frozen negotiation platform between Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation and Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council has resumed its function with four meetings held between Chiang Pinkung and Chen Yun-lin. These four meetings have reached some mutual agreements regarding three links, direct communications and trading business. Currently, the most salient issue on the cross-strait platform is the so-called ”Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement” (ECFA). Most recently, it has seemed as if the ECFA is ready to be signed by both sides of the Taiwan Strait. However, voices that oppose this agreement have made themselves known from the very beginning when the issue was brought up by the Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan. Furthermore, the public opinion polls done by Taiwan's mass media often show that around 70% of Taiwanese people say that they do not understand the content of the so-called ECFA and feel rather confused by it. This paper asks the following: What kind of role has the only representative organ in Taiwan's Central Government-The Legislative Yuan-been playing in the process of cross-strait negotiations between Taiwan and the Mainland regarding all of these agreements that highly involve the benefits and rights of each individual Taiwanese? What kinds of oversight strategies has it employed? And what kinds of constraints has it encountered in the process of conducting its oversight functions? Finally, how can it still enact certain oversight functions under the current constraints? This paper addresses the above questions.