本文以第六與第七屆立委選舉賄選一審判決資料,分析影響立委選舉賄選的因素以及影響候選人當選的原因,重心放在選制變項的作用。實證發現,選制除了與賄選誘因顯著相關之外,也影響到賄選對當選的助益,在賄選誘因方面,首先在SNTV下,選區中候選人的數目或應選名額增加,或當選高門檻降低時,候選人進行賄選的機率跟著增加;不過在FPTP下,同一選區候選人數目增加時,候選人進行賄選的機率並不會跟著增加。與此相關,實證也發現,同一選區中同黨參選人數目多少也是預測賄選出現機率的顯著變項。而在影響當選的因素方面,在SNTV中,進行賄選會增加當選的機率;不過在FPTP下,賄選對增加當選的機率並沒有明顯的幫助。其次,在SNTV中,候選人或其樁腳在過往的參選經歷中曾有賄選案件被起訴或判刑,並不會影響其當選的機率,不過在FPTP下,候選人過往賄選記錄會降低其當選的機率。
This article examines the effect of electoral system on vote-buying incentives and the effectiveness of vote-buying. By assembling judicial records, this article compares on the 2004 and 2008 legislative elections, which undertake SNTV and FPTP respectively. It shows that greater number of candidates in a given district, larger district magnitude, or higher effective threshold are all associated with higher instances of vote-buying behaviors. In those districts, candidates face intense intraparty competition and only needs to gather a small portion of votes to be elected, both factors contributing to prevalent vote-buying. As for the 2008 election, the number of candidates in a given district and effective threshold are no longer significant predictors of vote-buying. Since under FPTP two major parties dominate the election, the effective numbers of candidates are identical across districts, rendering the two factors not significant. As for the effectiveness of vote-buying, we find that vote-buying is positive and significant only under SNTV. On the other hand, vote-buying records hurt candidates' subsequent election performance only under FPTP.
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