石油輸出國家組織之Cournot動態差分競局實證研究

本研究以石油輸出國家組織(OPEC)為例，建構了國際原油市場生命週期的Cournot動態差分競局模型(Cournot dynamic difference game model)，詮釋其卡特爾(cartel)的整合過程；該線型函數模型的推演下，可得到各種均衡模型下具特殊經濟意義之量與價的時徑解，以及不同型態之Pindyck市場獨佔力量指標的衡量公式，並證明OPEC內部二派合作之下，能產生提昇利潤及降低成本的協力增效(synergy)及策略性聯盟的效果，達到聯合利潤極大的Pareto最適狀況；該線型函數模型能以實際資料配合經濟計量方法，將各時段「不同目標函數」最適化條件下所產生之「不同行為」的非線型最終解方程式，同時納入原直線型的結構上程式體系，作「融合」式(pooling)的估計、驗證及模擬分析，為一理論與實證結合之應用模型。此外，本文並與孫智陸及林佳琪(1996)之短期準動態模型作比較，以期驗證短期下之短視行為(myopic behavior)是否存在，及長期下之理性行為是否為常態。

關鍵字

動態差分競局；卡特爾；協力增效；市場獨占力量指標；短視行為

並列摘要

This article takes the OPEC as an example, constructing a Cournot life cycle dynamic difference game model of the international crude oil market, with explaining the integration of the cartel. In each equilibrium model, I could obtain price and quantity time path solutions and derived out the Pindyck market power index in different types of market through the linear model specified and inferenced. Also, I could justify the results of synergy effects from rising price and strategic frealignment effects from decreasing average production cost, the two effects push the OPEC member’s cooperative behavior to the Pareto optimal condition. All the different behavior results in every period of this modeling theory could be pooled, nonlinearly estimated, tested, simulated, and forecasted by econometrics. Additionally, by comparing previous quasi-dynamic model (Sun & Lin,1996) with this newly life cycle dynamic optimal control model, I could test whether the short run myopic behavior or the long run rational behavior normally existing.