物業管理運作機制中代理問題之研究

建築物之類型與物權型態的改變，導致建築物的管理類型由自行管理轉變為全部委託管理，業主與物業管理因訂定契約之方式，使得相互間產生委託代理關係。然而，在代管的過程中，代理人比委託人擁有較多的資訊，因而引發資訊不對稱之情況。本研究將深入針對物業管理運作機制所產生代理問題進行研究，依據本研究結果顯示如下：代理人行為所產生之代理問題，分為逆選擇、隱藏行動之道德危機、隱藏訊息之道德危機、訊息傳遞、訊息甄別篩選等五大項目，其實際作為經統計後顯示受訪者認為隱匿本身能力不足者佔91%，隱藏對業主不利之資訊者佔94%，投機怠工者佔97%，透過訊息或行動式探業主之底線以降低成本者佔95%，為主要之代理問題。本研究僅針對討物業管理運作機制中，因資訊不對稱所產生委託人與代理人間之目標衝突及代理問題，期以提供業界了解資訊不對稱之下如何解決代理問題及業主與物業管理業間之風險分攤之參考。

關鍵字

物業管理；委託代理理論；資訊不對稱；代理問題

並列摘要

Changes in the construction types and property ownership forms often result in the transition of building management from self-management model to full commission model. By signing commission contracts, the building owner and the commission agent form a principal-agent relationship between them. However, in the commissioned management process, the agent tends to possess more information than the principal, causing inequity of information asymmetry between them. This study explores the problems of commissioned management of real estate and finds that the problems caused by agent behaviors can be divided into five major categories- adverse selection; moral hazards in hiding actions; moral hazards in hiding information; information transmission, and information screening. According to the statistical analysis results, this study finds the surveyed subjects think hiding competence insufficiency (91 %); hiding information detrimental to the owner (94%); opportunism and negligence (97 %); and using information or taking actions to explore the owner's bottom line to reduce costs (95%) are the major causes of agent problems. By focusing on conflicting goals and the other commission problems caused by the information asymmetry between the owner and the agent, this study is intended to provide helpful references in solving these problems and spreading risks between the owner and the agent.

並列關鍵字

Property Management ； principal-agent ； Agency Problem ； Screening Model ； Moral Hazard Model

國際替代計量

物業管理運作機制中代理問題之研究

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