牟宗三在《心體與性體》一書中使用「道德的形上學」(Moral Metaphysics)和「道德底形上學」(Metaphysics of Morals)兩組概念區分儒家與康德的道德哲學,而筆者認為唐君毅早年在《道德自我之建立》一書中已經提供了一個「道德的形上學」的版本。本文嘗試把這條進路依次分成三個命題來整理其論證:(1)道德自我是心之本體;(2)心之本體是宇宙之本體;(3)世界中所有物質和心靈皆為心之本體之表現。唐君毅在他的論證中引用許多德國觀念論哲學家,主要是康德、費希特、黑格爾的理論。本文主要有兩個目的:(1)對於唐君毅所使用的德國觀念論哲學家的理論就其來源加以考察;(2)檢討其中論證的優劣。
In Mind-Substance and Nature-Substance (《心體與性體》) Mou Zongsan makes a distinction between Moral Metaphysics and Metaphysics of Morals in order to distinguish moral philosophy of Confucianism from Kant's. In Tang Junyi's early work The Formation of Moral Self (《道德自我之建立》) one finds already clearly his own version of Moral Metaphysics. This paper attempts to summarize Tang's arguments in the following three propositions: (1)Moral Self is the Metaphysical substance of Mind; (2)Metaphysical substance of Mind and Metaphysical substance of Universe; (3)(finite)Materials and (finite)Minds in the World are all the manifestations of metaphysical Substance of Mind. Tang Junyi selects many theoretical sources originated from German Idealists, mainly Kant, Fichte and Hegel. This paper has two aims: (1) to trace the sources of philosophy of German Idealism in Tang Junyi's arguments; (2) to evaluate his arguments.