《墨子》之「權」何以可能？

本文以《墨子．大取》中對「權」的描述為邏輯起點，通過剖析「權」的過程中所存在的問題，嘗試給予補充和修正，並使之形成完整的倫理建構。首先，本文通過澄清《墨子》關於「權」的概念及其倫理建構，然後進一步批判性地考察了「權」倫理本身所存在的問題。同時，本文還嘗試從道德情感的角度，強調「權」倫理應當關注人的情感和合理利己的正當性，從而完善對「權」倫理的重構。最後，本文試圖回應一些可能的反駁，尤其是威廉斯所提出的「個人完整性」和「道德運氣」。基於此，我們將看到作為一種規範力量的「權」倫理雖然並不反對傳統的規範倫理學，但它既不完全屬於道義論，也不應當被歸之於功利主義。《墨子》之「權」的可能性，建立在動機和結果同等重要的基礎上，若行為者的動機沒有產生預期的行為結果，或者行為結果不是出自行為者的動機，都算不得是權衡過後「應當如何」的行為要求和道德理由。

關鍵字

《墨子》；《大取》；權；兩難困境；道德理由

並列摘要

Based on the description of quan(权) in Ta-ch'ü(大取) as a logical starting point, this essay trys to supplement and correct the existing problems in the process of quan and make it form a complete ethical construction. First of all, this essay clarifies the concept of quan and its ethical construction in Mozi, then further critically examines the problems existing in the ethics of quan. At the same time, this essay also tries to emphasize that the quan of moral principles should pay attention to human emotion and the legitimacy of reasonable self-interest from the perspective of moral emotion, so as to perfect the reconstruction of the ethics of quan. Finally, this essay attempts to respond to some possible refutations, especially Williams's ＂personal integrity＂ and ＂moral luck＂. According to the above, We will see that although the ethics of quan as a normative force does not oppose the traditional normative ethics, it is neither completely deontological nor should it be attributed to utilitarianism. The possibility of quan in Mozi is based on the fact that motivation and result are equally important. If the actor's motivation does not produce the expected behavior result, or the behavior result does not come from the actor's motivation, it is not the behavior requirement and moral reason of ＂how should＂ after weighing.