胡塞爾現象學心理學與超越論的現象學於認識的一致性上的交會與各自的矛盾

本文首先說明胡塞爾如何解釋認識主體跨越個別性達到認識一致性，即運用現象學心理學還原說明移情作用，再以超越論的現象學還原來奠定認識的確然。接著討論胡塞爾為何主張該二學科必得相互內含（implicit）始能作為超越論本質的現象學（eidetic phenomenology）去究明成就了認識一致性的意向相關，並述及兩學科若獨立運作會於該議題上出現的不足，也就是現象學心理學由於預設了自我主體的自明性而缺乏確然真相作為足夠穩固的研究根基，超越論的現象學則是無法在缺乏「身體作為人（即自我）的指標」的自我主觀意識下去單獨解釋移情作用。本文接著歸結出上述不足原因來自於學科原則與胡塞爾自身理念在「意識的等同綜合者是否可能超出認識主體」上的不一致，最後則延續現象學理念，試著提出得以貫徹學科精神的可能解方。

關鍵字

胡塞爾；現象學心理學；超越論的現象學；移情論；等同綜合；唯我論

並列摘要

In general, cognition process seems begin and end only in one's mind, where both perception and consciousness take place. However, daily life experiences tell us that organic subjectivities can communicate with each other by perceiving or being conscious of the same thing in the world. Here comes a question: How does the cognizing subjectivity not being limited in the mental life of its own, but let its mental content penetrate others', or join the same mental world with others, that is, how to make different cognizing subjectivities cognize the same objectivities? And in this paper I use ＂the concordant cognition＂ to describe that kind of cognition. I will first illustrate how Husserl solved this question by Phenomenological cognition system: He applied Psychological- Phenomenological reduction to explain the operation of Empathy, so as to claim that different cognizing subjectivities will in the same step of cognition adequacy accomplishment when facing the same objectivities. Then Transcendental Phenomenological reduction was applied to establish cognition apodicticity. This shows why Husserl stated only if the two disciplines complement mutually can concordant cognition be well explicated. Psychological Phenomenology lacks apodictic truth to be its foundation on account of presupposing ego-subject is evident. Transcendental Phenomenology is not able to supple Empathy without applying ego-subject and thus ignoring its principle. This paper discusses difficulties the two disciplines face separately, and thus finds out ＂Meeting the issue of whether Identifying Synthesis is carried out by one transcends the cognizing subject, Husserl's idea and purpose are in fact violate the principles of two disciplines＂ as the root cause of these contradictions. At the end, I will try to find way out of the problem while following regulations of Phenomenology. The solutions I supposed is either accept Solipsism, or modify Transcendental Phenomenology by replacing ego-subject with what I called ＂world subjectivity＂.