An Affirmative Explanation of Wittgenstein's Concept of Use in Philosophical Investigation

蒲世豪(Shi-Hao Pu)

《華岡哲學學報》 1期 (2009/06) Pp. 47-78

https://doi.org/10.29988/HKJP.200906.0003

摘要

維根斯坦《哲學探討》(1953)的分析在意義論題上有極重要的地位，這些以斷想(remark)著成之論述由多方對指謂式(referential)、圖像式(pictorial)以及感覺式(上標 **)意義概念提出深入有趣的批評，並提出「意義即使用」，本文試圖由正面澄清其所謂使用概念。當維根斯坦反覆強調「意義即使用」或「只有語言之使用能代表其意涵」，其「使用」之意為何？
本文強調「正面理解」至少有三個意思。首先，本文不想將使用概念的重心放在對某種傳統或觀點的反對或批評之上，這類說法是對《哲學探討》重要的詮釋，不過筆者以為要更深入理解維根斯坦「為什麼」要批評這些錯誤，似乎仍有待正面解釋意義或使用的主張。其次，本文反對使用是一種毫無具體限制，將實際溝通中所有相關因素均包含在內的概念，因為這樣不但沒有解釋，甚至會遭到維根斯坦自身論點的批評。最後，本文強調理解使用概念時不應預設與意義概念等價或比意義更複雜的概念來解釋，因為這不但會遭致解釋上的矛盾，更讓我們的詮釋陷入無限後退的迷霧之中。
站在前段的說法上，要如何正面地解釋何謂「使用」呢？還有一個麻煩待處理：正面肯定「使用是什麼」的句子會招致解釋形式的麻煩，因為一般解釋概念通常不是訴諸概念的內涵，就是界定出該概念應用的對象，但維根斯坦既不認為「使用」是所有語言活動之共同內涵，也不認為其只是眾多語言活動之「總集」，結果常見兩種方法都行不通。如何才能避開此困境呢？透過文本分析，我認為正面肯定使用一個可行方式是「給範例」：我們要為維根斯坦的「使用」提出具體而富代表性的範例，用例子來解釋它。傳統觀點可能認為「給範例」不算有意義的解釋，但這是來自於「定義」迷思，由哲學角度解釋一個概念不等於尋找這個概念的定義，而是尋找一種整體性的理解與認識，如果具體範例能達到這種效果，未失不是一種好的解釋。
何種範例能有效且正面地解釋使用概念？審視文本後，我發現命令句或表情句是很好的例子。這兩類例子將語言所具有之意義視為對別人行為或態度產生之影響，而且這兩些影響往往相當簡單，不需預設比意義概念更複雜的概念。以此為例，使用即語言之影響力，語言對實際活動之影響力是一種對使用概念正面的詮釋，並沒有第二部分批評三種非正面的問題。維根斯坦不但反覆強調說話的意義在於對他人的影響，也常舉例強調聽話之理解是一種「被影響」而非認知，正面理解使用概念是將語言意義理解為「如同」具有影響力的行動「此類」的活動。
維根斯坦對語言意義的解釋其實意在解釋人類思考的本質，使用意義理論可說是一種視人類思考之本質為「行動」或「行為」的理論，雖然它並未斷言思考可以化約到行動，或思想的每部分都有行動與之相對應，但此理論的確認為在哲學上對於思考正確的理解，需要回到其所帶來的行動之上。如果審慎於字詞的使用，我們可以說此理論認為思考是一種行動模式或行動模式的延長，我認為這是使用概念的正面解釋。本篇文章的階段性目的即到此為止，在文章最後部份，我解釋了本文作為更長遠研究計畫下的意義。

關鍵字

維根斯坦 ； 使用概念 ； 意義 ； 行動

並列摘要

The purpose of this paper is to formulate an affirmative explanation of the concept of use in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigation. As far as we know, there has abundant interpretation and explanation of this idea, but as I consider it, I find not each of them can serve as an affirmative answer to what is use. In the first two sections, I indicate three kinds of interpretation as non-affirmative explanation of use. The first one declines the most significant work of Philosophical Investigation is to criticize certain attractive but totally wrong picture of our language. The second one focuses on the uncountable relevant factor in concrete context of linguistic practice. The third one tries to explain the concept of use by some more complex or equivalent concept (ex. successful application) which lead our understanding nowhere. I agree the former interpretations could be correct according certain fragments of Philosophical Investigation, but they are helpless and hopeless in giving a constructive way of our thought and language.
But there is a good reason for the former negative answers. Wittgenstein is famous for his attacking on overt universallization of important philosophical concept. He warned us against the forced common feature of linguistic practice and use should not be any universal of our linguistic practice. But how can we understand a concept without any description of it? He suggested that we should look for proper example of games instead of the proper definition. The affirmative explanation of use should be a proper example instead of description.
The adequate examples in explaining Wittgenstein's concept of use are sentences which can have observable influence. The expressions or sentences express emotion or giving order are always his favorite instances in discussion. It is the influence of our words rather than any cognitive information makes our sound language. Use theory of meaning could be seen as a conceptual scheme which tries to understand the nature of human thought by their effect on human action and behavior. This is what I called the affirmative answer. The last section also contain outline of my own project in interpreting Wittgenstein in this way.

並列關鍵字

Wittgenstein ； concept of use ； meaning ； action

參考文獻

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Carruthers, Peter(1984).Baker and Hacker's Wittgenstein.Synthese.58,451-79.

Damasio, Antonio(1996).Descartes' error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain.London:Papermac.

Davidson, Donald(2001).Truth and meaning.Inquiries into truth and interpretation.(Inquiries into truth and interpretation).: