The Association between Cash Payouts to Shareholders and Financial Reporting Quality

發放現金予股東與財務報告品質間之關連

馮抒緯(Shu-Wei Feng) ； 王全三(Chuan-San Wang)

《中華會計學刊》 9卷1期 (2013/01) Pp. 1-33

https://doi.org/10.6538/TAR.2013.0901.01

摘要

發放現金予股東及財務報告品質均屬重要的企業管理決策，高品質財務報告揭露較多的公司資訊，能支援公司的籌資活動，用以補充已經發放予股東的現金，進而使公司投資決策較不受發放現金股利的影響，此外，財務報告品質較差的公司，若能避免發放現金予股東，則可以減少後續的籌資活動，降低資本市場對公司進行審查的機會，因而本研究預期：發放現金予股東與財務報告品質之間有顯著的正向關連。實證結果顯示：發放現金股利的公司相對於完全未發放現金的公司而言，擁有較平穩的真實盈餘，且較不需要利用權衡應計數調整損益；而以買回庫藏股做為發放現金方式的公司，相對於完全未發放現金的公司而言，亦有較平穩的真實盈餘，但在權衡應計數的使用上，則與完全未發放現金公司之間，沒有顯著的差異。綜言之，發放現金股利予股東的公司，擁有較高的財務報告品質、買回庫藏股的公司次之，符合庫藏股交易較具彈性而現金股利較具持續性的特徵。在利用沙賓法案為外生變數的敏感性測試中，庫藏股買回與權衡應計數之間，呈現反向的替代關係，顯示庫藏股交易因能影響每股盈餘，具有實質盈餘管理的特徵，而支付現金股利的公司，因原本既具有較高的財務報告品質，故權衡應計數因沙賓法案而減少的數量，小於其他未發放現金股利的公司，此項測試結果支持本研究的假設及實證結果。

關鍵字

財務報告品質 ； 財務政策 ； 現金股利 ； 庫藏股交易

並列摘要

Both cash payouts to shareholders and financial reporting quality are results of careful corporate strategies. High-quality financial reporting supports fund-raising activities and facilitates firms to replenish cash paid to their shareholders. Firms that exercise accounting discretions to hide information from the market should avoid cash payouts in order to reduce the opportunities for the market to scrutinize over their financial reporting. These suggest a positive association between cash payouts to shareholders and financial reporting quality. Cash paid flexibly via share repurchases has additional impacts on earnings per share and should be less informative than cash dividends in terms of financial reporting quality. This study finds empirical results consistent with these predictions. In this study, dividend-paying firms have smoother income that is not adjusted by discretionary accruals than firms without cash payouts. Similar results are found when we compare firms buying back shares with nonpayers, but these two groups of firms do not have any significant difference in their reporting discretion. After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, cash paid via share repurchases substitutes for discretionary accruals, consistent with its nature being an alternative way of real earnings management. The Act reduced reporting discretion by a smaller degree for dividend-paying firms than others whose low-quality of financial reporting is more sensitive to regulatory changes. These comparisons among the different responses to the Act provide robustness checks to our empirical results.

並列關鍵字

financial reporting quality ； financial policy ； cash dividends ； share repurchases

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