取消審計公費下限與審計品質

1998年，我國會計師公會配合公平交易委員會之要求，取消審計公費下限之機制。過去的文獻指出，我國取消審計公費下限之後，導致審計市場更加競爭，而且具品牌聲譽會計師事務所提高了市場占有率。本研究進一步探討取消審計公費下限與審計品質之關聯性，並觀察此關聯性是否受品牌聲譽或更換會計師影響。本研究發現，我國取消審計公費下限之後，會計師的整體審計品質有顯著提高。此結論支持了我國廢止審計公費下限之政策。此外，具品牌聲譽之會計師提高審計品質的幅度，低於不具品牌聲譽的會計師。顯示只是提高審計品質，並無法提高其市場占有率；換言之，無法單靠提高審計品質而成為具品牌聲譽的會計師。

關鍵字

審計公費下限；品牌聲譽；會計師更換；審計品質

並列摘要

In 1998, the Certified Public Accountant of Republic of China (ROCCPA), in response to a request by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), abolished the audit fee floor in Taiwan. Past literature has pointed out that the audit market would become more competitive, and accounting firms with brand name reputation would get more market share after abolishing the audit fee floor. In this paper, we investigate the association between the abolishment of audit fee floor and audit quality. We also examine the effects of brand name reputation and auditor switch on such association. We discovered that the overall audit quality has increased after abolishing the audit fee floor, a conclusion that supports the original decision of abolishment. We also found that the audit quality of accounting firms with brand name reputation increased less than that of non-brand name accounting firms. This demonstrates that improving audit quality alone does not lead to a bigger market share, and a non-brand name firm cannot become a brand-name firm solely by increasing audit quality.