總經理過度自信、家族企業與租稅規避

本文探討總經理過度自信、家族企業與租稅規避之關聯性。參照Malmendier and Tate（2005）以總經理持股行為判斷過度自信，探究當總經理具過度自信時，企業是否有較激進避稅行為，並考慮家族企業的調節效果。以2005年至2015年台灣上市櫃公司為樣本，實證結果顯示，企業聘僱過度自信總經理時，會出現較激進租稅規避。若將企業區分為家族與非家族企業，則家族企業會舒緩總經理過度自信與企業租稅規避間關聯，使稅規避程度較低。進一步探究家族企業特性的調節效果是否主要來自家族成員總經理，發現家族總經理與非家族總經理的調節效果並無顯著差異。如果總經理任期超過十年時，則家族企業對舒緩總經理過度自信之調節效果，主要來自家族成員總經理，而不是來自非家族成員總經理。

關鍵字

過度自信；租稅規避；家族企業

並列摘要

This study examines the effect of managerial overconfidence and family firm characteristics on tax avoidance, according to the third measure in Malmendier and Tate (2005) that relates to proxy managerial overconfidence, based on stockholding behavior. We investigate whether firms with overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) avoid more tax, and whether family firm characteristics can moderate the effects of managerial overconfidence on tax avoidance. Our sample includes Taiwanese listed and over-the-counter (OTC) companies from 2005 to 2015, excluding Taiwan Depositary Receipt (TDR), F-share, financial, and insurance industries. Empirical results indicate that firms with overconfident CEOs do avoid more tax. Further results show that the effect of managerial overconfidence on tax avoidance is negatively moderated by family characteristics, which means overconfident CEOs in family firms avoid less tax than overconfident CEOs in non-family firms. We then split CEOs in family firms into family and non-family members, and found that the moderating effect of family characteristics remained indifferent no matter whether or not CEOs in family firms were family members.