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會計盈餘之監督與評價角色關聯性之研究:台灣實證結果

The Relation between the Stewardship and Valuation Roles of Accounting Earnings: Empirical Evidence from Taiwan

摘要


過去研究已發現,會計盈餘在決定股價及監督評估管理者績效上均扮演重要角色(分別稱為盈餘的評價與監督角色)。本研究旨在以國內上市公司之資料,探討「公司價值-盈餘敏感性」與「總經理薪酬-盈餘敏感性」間的關係,亦即盈餘的評價與監督角色是否具有關聯性。實證結果發現,在控制其它因素後,公司價值-盈餘敏感性與總經理薪酬-盈餘敏感性呈顯著的正向關係。表示我國董事會平均而言,在設計總經理薪酬計畫時,會依據當期盈餘時效性來決定盈餘之薪酬權數,俾促使總經理決定當期努力水準時,將其本期行動對公司價值全部影響的折現值皆考慮在內。

並列摘要


Previous studies have shown that accounting earnings play an informational role both in determining stock prices (valuation role) and in evaluating and compensating top corporate executive performance (stewardship role). The purpose of this study is to investigate the relation between the valuation and stewardship roles of accounting earnings, using Taiwanese listed firms as the sample. Since the capitalization rate of earnings into value also influences the marginal product of current period actions, we expect that value-earnings sensitivities (VES) and compensation-earnings sensitivities (CES) are positive correlated. The empirical evidence demonstrates that there actually exists a positive link between VES and CES after controlling for other agency-based determinants of CES. This result implies that the Board of Taiwanese listed firms, as the Board of firms in the United States, may try to mitigate managers' myopic decision behavior by taking the timeliness of current earnings into consideration in designing accounting earnings' compensation weights. Our study contributes to advancing our understanding on the relation between the stewardship and valuation roles of earnings in an emerging market.

參考文獻


林淑惠、胡星陽(2003)。上市公司高階經理人之酬勞結構。經濟論文。31(2),171-206。
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