財務危機下固定資產流動性之研究

The Study of Asset Liquidity Under Financial Distress

徐銘傑(Ming-Chieh Hsu) ； 陳業寧(Yeh-Ning Chen) ； 何憲章(Hsien-Chan Ho)

《中國財務學刊》 5卷4期 (1998/04) Pp. 21-50

https://doi.org/10.6545/JoFS.1998.5(4).2

摘要

本研究由資產結構的角度，探討財務危機公司因固定資產流動性問題所產生之投資不效率。我們設立－考慮固定資產買賣之財務危機模型。在模型中，股東－經理人有四種策略：出售固定資產、借入新資金、向債權人再融資及自行全額再增資；債權人則有三種策略：再融資、補貼及不理會股東－經理人。模型中的重要變數均固定資產流動性及投資業成功機率。依據股東－經理人是否能與債權人協商及公司現存負債契約中有無優先償債無止條款，看見們分別分析各種情況下財務危機公司的投資效率。本研究發現：（一）在資訊對稱的情況下，長期債權人會容忍某些程度的投資不效率以避免無謂的資產流動性損失；（二）股東－經理人即使有能力自行再增資以避免公司遭到破產清算，其在均衡時也未必會自行再增資；（三）當債權人無法協商時，無諭投資計劃之淨現值為正或負，股東－經理人都將進行投資，使財務危機公司發生投資過度之無效率現象；（四）當債權人可協商時，雖然還是無法完全消除財務危機公司之過度投資行為，但債權人之介入，將會改善投資過度之問題。

關鍵字

財務危機 ； 資產流動性

並列摘要

This paper investigates the relationship between asset liquidity and investment efficiency of financially distressed firms. In the literature, there have been lots of discussions on behavior of financially distressed firms when contracts restructuring and financial restructuring are available. This paper contributes to the literature by taking into account the possibility that distressed firms may sell their assets to solve financial problems. Several interesting results are found. First, the owner-manager of a distressed firm will endure investment inefficiency if the firm's assets are highly illiquid. Second, the owner-manager may' allow bankruptcy to happen even if he has the money to avoid it. Third, overinvestment occurs if the owner-manager cannot negotiate with debtholders. Finally, the overinvestment problem is mitigated when the owner-manager can negotiate with debtholders.

並列關鍵字

Financial distress ； Assets liquidity