佛教之生命倫理觀──以「複製人」與「胚胎幹細胞」為例

Buddhist Bioethics: The Case of Human Cloning and Embryo Stem Cell Research

釋惠敏(Huimin Bhikkhu)

《中華佛學學報》 15期 (2002/07) Pp. 482-495

https://doi.org/10.6986/CHBJ.200207.0482

摘要

宗教界與一般社會對於生命醫學的發展，在宗教與倫理上，反應下列幾種問題：(1)侵犯神的領域（創造權，生死主宰權）；(2)冒犯人的尊嚴（生命「唯物化」、「商品化」）；(3)對傳統生殖與家族關係的挑戰；過度狂妄的優生政策。從佛教教義與戒律來看「複製人」與胚胎幹細胞的議題。對於生命的起源，佛教是以「緣起論」來說明，應該不會有侵犯神的領域的問題。對於「獨一自我」（identity）權，佛教是主張「無我論」，所以比較能適當的詮釋與理解。雖然，佛教《彌沙塞部和醯五分律》之「殺人戒」也將胚胎的發育過程，分析為「似人」（入母胎已後至四十九日）與「人」（超過四十九日之後）的差別。但是，若是有殺胎兒的意圖，不論是「似人」或「人」都是屬於「殺人」的重罪（波羅夷）。此外，《瑜伽師地論》〈瑜伽菩薩戒本〉論及菩薩可能基於「善權方便，為利他故」，寧願自己受苦報，以憐愍心而殺惡人，阻止惡人犯重大惡業而受大苦報。但是，並沒有討論到可否以人類胚胎來利益其他眾生的議題。面對佛陀時代所未出現的生物科技進步所衍生的發展，例如：人工協助生殖術、胚胎分裂複製法、核移植複製法、胚胎幹細胞株之研究等，可能產生不同生命型態的區隔。例如：細胞的生命與個人的整體生命，胚胎（embryo）與前胚胎（preembryo，受精卵後14天內），實驗室的胚胎與子宮內的胚胎等。當代的佛教界需要研討此一新領域的戒律問題，配合醫療相關法規修訂，希望能建立規範與基準，以便對於「保護生命」及「改善生命」發生衝突時，找出適當的平衡點。

關鍵字

生命倫理 ； 複製人 ； 胚胎幹細胞 ； 殺人戒 ； 無我論

並列摘要

In view of recent advances in the medical sciences, religious circles and society in general have reacted based on ethical and religious concerns. Negative reactions are based on fears that such developments: 1) infringe upon God's jurisdiction (to create, to control birth and death), 2) violate human dignity (life becomes ＂materialistic＂ and ＂commercialized＂), 3) challenges traditional modes of reproduction and family life, and 4) could lead to undesirable eugenic policies. Since the Buddhist explanation for the origin of life is based on the doctrine of dependent arising, from Buddhist doctrine and precepts it seems that human cloning and embryo stem cell research do not violate any kind of divine jurisdiction. As for the right to identity, Buddhism advocates the doctrine of no-self (which denies any sort of unitary, permanent, or immutable soul), and hence can interpret and understand such issues more accurately. In relation to the precept against not killing people, the Mahisasakavinaya divides the embryo's development into two stages, 1) ＂humanlike＂ (from zygote till 49 days later) and 2) ＂human＂ (after 49 days). However, if Buddhist monks or nuns intentionally kill the fetus, regardless of whether it is in the ＂humanlike＂ or ＂human＂ stage, they are guilty of a serious misdeed, a parajika (defeat) transgression. In addition, according to the Yogacarabhumi, a bodhisattva may, based on the idea of expedient means, choose to kill an evil person out of compassion, thereby taking upon himself karmic retribution and saving the evil person from suffering great karmic retribution. However,Buddhist scriptures do not discuss whether a human embryo can be used to benefit other sentient beings. As we consider new forms of biotechnology that did not exist during the Buddha's time such as human-assisted reproduction, cloning, and embryo stem cell research, we may find new divisions to ＂life.＂ For instance, cellular life as opposed to human life, embryo as opposed to pre-embryo, and (as a result of in-vitro fertilization procedures) embryos in a laboratory as opposed to embryos in a womb. Buddhists need to discuss such issues in relation to the precepts, and taking into consideration legal regulations, establish norms and criteria so that a balance can be struck between ＂protecting life＂ and ＂improving life＂ when these values conflict.

並列關鍵字

Bioethics ； Human Cloning ； Embryo Stem Cell ； The Precept of Killing ； The Doctrine of No-self

參考文獻

Annas, G. J.(1994).Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal.

Brock, D. W.(1995).Bioethics.

Nussbaum, M. C.,Sunstein, C. R.(1998).CLONES and CLONES: Facts and Fantasies About Human Cloning.Chicago:Chicago University Press.

Parfit, D.(1984).Reasons and Persons.Oxford:Oxford University Press.

森村進(1998).デレクバ－フイツト『理由と人格：非人格性の倫理へ』.勁草書房.